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Abstract
Return policies (aka. money-back-guarantee policies) are frequently offered by retailers such that consumers can bring back the purchased products that do not fit their
needs. On the benefit side, consumers perceive these policies as a risk-mitigation
service and are willing to pay more for an otherwise identical product. All else being
equal, being lenient in its return policy should allow a retailer to enjoy higher sales,
which leads to increased revenue. On the cost side, a generous return policy will induce more returns and possibly also late returns. In 2007 alone, U.S. manufacturers
and retailers paid more than $100 billion to process consumer returns. For electronic
products, this cost is estimated at $16.7 billion per year, which represents 6% of an
average electronics manufacturer’ revenue and 3% of an average retailer’s total sales.
The return rate in the retail sector ranges from 10% to 20%. To effectively manage
returns, a retailers should concurrently optimize its price and restocking fee so that
it could enjoy the most benefit from offering a return policy. At the same time, it
should also seek to better forecast the quantity of incoming returns and make efforts
to reduces the number of futures returns.
Despite the magnitude of the returns management problem, academic research on
this topic is still relatively scant. Through three separate studies, this dissertation
delves into returns management from a multitude of perspectives. The first study
explores a retailer’s optimal return policy when a fraction of the market is consist of
opportunistic consumers, who might purchase with the explicit intention of returning.
The second study demonstrates how retailers might use their point-of-sale data to
better forecast future returns, uncover the duration of consumers’ product trial, and
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identify products that are more likely to be returned. The last study introduces
a novel approach for retailers to quantify the incremental willingness-to-pay that
consumers assign to money-back-guarantee policies in the on-line environment.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Consumer product returns represent a substantial challenge and a size-able expense
for retailers and manufacturers. In 2007 alone, U.S. manufacturers and retailers paid
more than $100 billion to process consumer returns Blanchard (2007). For electronic
products, the cost of returns in the U.S. has been estimated at $16.7 billion per
year, representing 6% of revenue for an average consumer electronics manufacturer
and 3% of total sales for an average retailer (Douthit et al., 2011). According to
National Retail Federation (2011a), the return rate in the retail sector ranges from
10% to 20%. Despite such magnitude, research on the management of consumer
returns is relatively scant. This dissertation attempts to delve into three critical and
intriguing issues for managing returns. The key insights are previewed in following
three paragraphs.
Most retailers offer refunds to consumers who, after a trial period, return a product
that they find does not fit their needs. There is evidence from practice that some
consumers are willing to use this return option opportunistically, essentially “renting”
a product by using it during the trial period and then returning it. Restocking fees
(partial refunds) can be used to combat this behavior. However, such fees might be
viewed negatively by consumers in cases where the return is due to a true lack of fit.
We derive optimal pricing and return policies that explicitly consider both the extent
of opportunism (how many consumers consider such behavior) and the benefit of
opportunism (the attractiveness of the renting option). Our analysis reveals several
new insights for retailers regarding pricing and return policies when opportunism is
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present in the marketplace. We also examine the profit impact of changes in the
extent or benefit of opportunism, finding that this impact is not always intuitive, and
that increases in either of these two opportunism constructs can actually increase
profits in some cases. In an extension, we provide additional insights for when the
salvage value of returned items is linked to how much utility has been extracted by
the opportunistic consumer.
Almost all prescriptive practices for lowering the cost of processing returns require
a forecast of how many consumer returns will arrive in each period. Despite the
fact that retail transactions data is readily available and has been shown to provide
significantly better demand forecasts for new product sales, this data has not been
explored for forecasting consumer returns. Using a data set provided by a major U.S.
retail chain and consisting of 20,801 transactions of 2,483 electronic products, we
develop an econometric model that simultaneously explains the consumer’s experience
duration and return probability, which is in turn used for predicting return quantity
in a given time period. This approach yields 20% to 40% lower forecast errors than
the benchmark time-series models, and the performance gain is sustained even with a
very parsimonious set of explanatory variables. Our econometric model also identifies
promising managerial actions for lowering the cost of consumer returns such as better
targeting of buyer assistance programs and choosing different return time windows
for specific product families.
While Money-Back-Guarantee (MBG) return policies are common in practice, the
academic literature provides little guidance on the value, if any, that consumers assign
to such a policy. For on-line retailers, both shipping charges and seller reputation
may influence the perceived value of MBGs. A non-refundable forward shipping
charge is likely to be perceived by consumers as an implicit restocking fee and hence,
decrease the value of an MBG policy. On the other hand, good customer feedback
may signal that MBGs will be handled easily, thus increasing their value in the
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eyes of consumers. To investigate the value of MBGs in the on-line context, we
collect the final selling prices of identical products offered by different vendors (with
different return policies) on eBay auctions. Our data set includes 2946 transactions
across 86 consumer electronic products. Endogeneity of the MBG decision by sellers
is addressed using a maximum likelihood estimator based on the error correlation
structure. We estimate that offering an MBG policy for on-line consumer electronics
increases a customer’s valuation of a product by an average of 5.2% and show that this
increase is substantially influenced by both seller reputation and shipping charges.
Our results provide an empirical measure of the value of an MBG that can be weighed
against the cost implications of providing such a policy.

3

Chapter 2
Optimal Retail Return Policies with Consumer
Opportunism
2.1

Introduction and Literature

Returns are viewed as necessary by many retailers since it is often impossible for a
consumer to fully resolve all uncertainty regarding the fit of the item to her needs
before a purchase is made (Nelson 1970). In-store assistance, on-line reviews, and
other resources can provide some information, but a trial period is often needed
to assess fit. Indeed, Ferguson et al. (2006) explain that products are often returned
with no functional or cosmetic defect, but rather because a mismatch between product
attributes and consumer preferences is revealed during the trial period. Reasons for
mismatch can include installation difficulty, product performance issues, or remorse
(Kumar et al., 2002). Given the role of the trial period in resolving fit uncertainty,
it is generally accepted that consumers should have the opportunity to return a nondefective retail purchase for a refund (possibly net of a restocking fee) if, after further
evaluation, they find that it does not meet their needs. However, consumer returns are
not driven exclusively by product mismatch with consumer needs – some consumers
take advantage of lenient return policies by purchasing items with the explicit intent
of returning them after a period of use, essentially “renting” the items. Familiar
examples of such opportunistic behavior include buying a digital camcorder to use
on a single vacation or buying a cocktail dress to wear to one event. This type of
behavior is well-known among retailers. Best Buy identified such consumers as “devil”
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customers (McWilliams, 2004), while studies of apparel retailers have dubbed the
behavior “wardrobe borrowing” (Wood, 2001). According to a recent survey by the
National Retail Federation (2011b), 61.4% of retailers experience such opportunistic
returns.
Most analytical models of consumer returns assume that no consumers will consider opportunistic behavior (e.g. Su, 2009; Shulman et al., 2011; Hsiao and Chen,
2012; Akçay et al., 2013). On the other hand, a few studies have assumed that all
consumers will consider opportunistic behavior (Chu et al., 1998; Hess et al., 1996).
We suggest that the best representation of reality lies between these two extremes.
Specifically, since opportunistic behavior is not consistent with the intention of the
returns policy, it may be viewed as socially unacceptable by some consumers (indeed,
casual conversations about this research have elicited responses ranging from open
admissions of opportunistic behavior to expressions of outrage at the idea). Willingness to consider such actions is a function of one’s psychological traits such as
self-concept (Mazar and Ariely, 2006) and symbolic self-completion (Rosenbaum and
Kuntze, 2005). Laboratory evidence has shown that individuals who emphasize the
alignment between self-image and social desirability will not engage in opportunistic behavior (Mazar et al., 2008). Thus, a model of returns behavior should reflect
the fact that some consumers reject opportunistic behavior while others include it
in their consideration set. Accordingly, in this study we assume that there exists an
exogenous fraction of consumers who will consider opportunistic returns behavior.
We use the analytical framework of Su (2009) (see also Akçay et al., 2013) to
model a retail context in which returns might occur due to a low realized valuation
of the product once uncertainty has been eliminated after purchase. We augment
this framework to accommodate the coexistence of two consumer segments - an “opportunistic” segment (willing to consider renting items) and an “ordinary” segment
(does not consider the renting option). The impact of opportunism on the retailer
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is conceptualized as having two components: the size of the opportunistic segment
(which we refer to as the extent of opportunism), and the fraction of product value
that can be extracted by opportunistic consumers during the trial period (the benefit of opportunism). In the following sections we examine the impact of these two
opportunism constructs on the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy and profits.

2.2

Model

We consider a monopoly retailer selling to a market consisting of some mix of opportunistic and ordinary consumers. We first delineate how each segment makes its
purchase and subsequent keep/return decisions. We then determine the resultant
demand from each segment and derive total retailer profits.

Consumers
The products of interest for our analysis are experience goods (Nelson, 1970). At the
time of purchase, consumers face uncertainty regarding whether an experience good
will match their needs. This uncertainty will be resolved after product trial. Following
the approach of Su (2009) and Akçay et al. (2013), we assume that consumers have
the same ex ante evaluation of the product, v0 , and their ex post adjustments to this
initial evaluation, ε, are random draws from a common distribution. Specifically,
we let v0 =

1
2

and ε uniformly distributed between − 21 and 21 . Put it differently,

consumers’ true evaluation of the product, v = v0 + ε, is uniformly distributed1
between 0 and 1.
As described in the Introduction, consumers in our model are categorized into
two groups based on their willingness to opportunistically use the return policy to
1

The assumption that a consumer’s post-trial product evaluation follows a uniform distribution
is consistent with previous analytical models of consumer returns (e.g. Akçay et al., 2013; Shulman
et al., 2011).

6

rent a product. Ordinary consumers use the product trial period for its intended
purpose — to assess fit. They do not consider renting, as they find this behavior to
be inconsistent with social norms and thus unacceptable. Opportunistic consumers
do not find renting unacceptable, either because it is accepted by their social peers
or because they have a low regard for social desirability (Mazar and Ariely, 2006;
Mazar et al., 2008). Note that opportunistic consumers do not simply use the trial
period to asses fit - instead, they use the product intensively during the trial period,
and hence their returns might be in worse condition than returns made by ordinary
consumers. We denote size of segment of opportunistic consumers, i.e. the extent of
opportunism, as γ. It follows that rest of the market, 1 − γ, is made up of ordinary
consumers.
Each consumer makes two decisions: first, she decides whether or not to buy
the product; secondly, after realizing her true valuation of the product, she decides
whether to keep or return it. Assuming a price p and a restocking fee f , an ordinary
consumer who has purchased will keep the product if her realized product evaluation,
v, is at least as high as the refund, p − f . If the opposite is true (v < p − f ), she will
return the product and claim the refund. Thus, her expected net utility from making
the purchase is Uor = E max(v, p − f ) − p. Uor can be simplified as follows:
Uor = E max(v, p − f ) − p =

Z 1
p−f

vdv +

Z p−f
0

(p − f )dv − p =

1 + (p − f )2 − 2p
(2.1)
2

Opportunistic consumers consider abusing the return policy such that they partially consume the product during the trial period and pay the restocking fee. Essentially, this abusive behavior is analogous to renting from the retailer, where rental
period is the return time window and rental charge is the restocking fee. Let β denote
the fraction of product value consumed before return, β ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that the
rent option gives opportunistic consumers βv + p − f utility. That is, the sum of the
consumed product value, βv, and the refund, p − f . We refer to β as the benefit of
opportunism and suggest that it is largely product-specific. Consider, for example, a
7

tuxedo versus a casual jacket. The former is typically used on rare occasions, while
the latter is intended for everyday wear. In other words, a larger proportion of the
value of a tuxedo can be consumed in just a few uses, as opposed to the much slower
consumption of a casual jacket. Thus, ceteris paribus, the tuxedo has a much higher
β than the casual jacket (a similar example of the product-specific nature of β was
observed in the experimental study of Hjort and Lantz (2012)). The same logic applies for many other product categories – camcorders vs. music players, sunglasses
vs. eyeglasses. etc. – in which some items might be needed for use on specific,
rare occasions (such as a camcorder or sunglasses on a vacation) while others provide
recurring benefits over a longer period of time.
For the opportunistic segment, a consumer who has purchased the product compares the utilities of renting, βv + p − f , and keeping, v, to decide whether to make
an opportunistic return. The two options have the same utility when v =
β is large, i.e.

p−f
1−β

p−f
.
1−β

When

> 1, it is possible that opportunistic consumers will always return.

In this case, their expected net utility from purchasing the product Uop is simply
E(βv + p − f ) − p. If β is small and hence

p−f
1−β

≤ 1, their expected net utility Uop is

E max(v, βv + p − f ) − p instead. Uop can be simplified as follows:

Uop =





E max(v, βv



E(βv

+ p − f) − p =

+ p − f) − p =

β
2

1−β+(f −p)2 −2p(1−β)
2(1−β)

−f

for

p−f
1−β

≤ 1,

for

p−f
1−β

> 1.

(2.2)

We restrict our attention to γ ∈ [0, 21 ], which essentially states that there are
more ordinary consumers than opportunistic consumers in the market2 . If a product is returned by an ordinary consumer, the retailer earns restocking fee f plus
salvage value s1 net unit product cost c, i.e. f + s1 − c. If returned by an opportunistic consumer, the retailer earns f + s2 − c instead. s1 > s2 captures the fact
2
National Retail Federation (2011a) reports that fraudulent returns, which nest abusive returns
as a subset, represent around 8.5% of total returns. This implies that the population of consumers
that consider return policy abuse is not likely to be very large, making this a reasonable restriction
on γ.
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that opportunistic returns are in worse condition due to excessive wear and tear. In
addition, we assume that

1
2

> c > s1 , which implies that the retailer’s unit product

cost is less than consumers’ average product evaluation but larger than unit salvage
value. Lastly, when a buyer retains her purchase, the retailer earns p − c. Denote the retailer’s unit profit from ordinary consumers as πor . Given the respective
probabilities of keeping the product, 1 − (p − f ), and returning it, p − f , we have
πor = (p − c)[1 − (p − f )] + (f + s1 − c)(p − f ). Denote the unit profit from opportunistic consumers as πop1 for

p−f
1−β

< 1 and πop2 for

some opportunistic consumers return, and when


return. Thus we have πop1 = 1 −

p−f
1−β



p−f
1−β
p−f
1−β

> 1. Recall that when

p−f
1−β

< 1,

> 1, all opportunistic consumers

p−f
(f + s2 − c) and πop2 = f + s2 − c.
(p − c) + 1−β

Normalizing the market size to 1, the retailer’s profit function is as follows.

π=





(1 − γ)πor



(1 − γ)πor

+ γπop1
+ γπop2

for

p−f
1−β

≤ 1,

for

p−f
1−β

> 1.

(2.3)

The retailer’s problem is to choose the price p and restocking fee f that maximize
(2.3) subject to the constraints that both segments of consumers participate in the
market (Uor ≥ 0, Uop ≥ 0).3 The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The retailer chooses the price p and restocking fee f .
2. Consumers make their purchases and realize their true valuations v.
3. Ordinary consumers keep the product if v > p − f and return it otherwise;
opportunistic consumers keep the product if v > βv+p−f and return otherwise.

2.3

Results

Solving the retailer’s optimization problem yields the following lemma:
3

In Appendix A, we show that it is always profit maximizing for the retailer to serve both
1−s1 +2s21 2s2 +s21 (−1+s2 (2+s2 ))
segments as long as a mild condition on unit product cost , c < M in[
,
],
2
4s2
holds.
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Figure 2.1 Retailer’s Optimal Return Policy Regions

Lemma 2.1. The retailer’s optimal price (p∗ ) and restocking fee (f ∗ ) depend on the
extent (γ) and the benefit (β) of opportunism, which together define three regions of
the solution space. Table A.2 in Appendix A summarizes p∗ , f ∗ , and optimal profit
(π ∗ ), as well as the boundary conditions for each region. Figure 2.3 provides a visual
illustration of the three optimal policy regions (c = 0.35, s1 = 0.3, and s2 = 0.15 in
that figure).
Note that when there is no opportunistic consumer (γ = 0), our optimal price
(p∗ =

1+s21
)
2

and restocking fee (f ∗ =

(1−s1 )2
)
2

are consistent with previous literature

(Akçay et al., 2013; Su, 2009) given the uniform distribution of v. Next, we provide
rationale for why the retailer should adopt three distinctive types of return policies.
First, consider the difference between Case I and the other two cases. The benefit
of opportunism, β, captures the opportunistic consumers’ incentive to rent the product. When β is low, it is relatively easy to induce opportunistic consumers to keep the
product, since the benefit of renting is relatively low. As β increases, the appeal of
keeping the purchased item, as opposed to renting and returning it, is reduced (recall
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p−f
that the probability of keep for the opportunistic segment is 1 − 1−β
). Consequently,

the opportunistic segment will always rent when β is sufficiently high - this occurs
in Cases II and III in the Figure. The difference between Cases II and III can be
understood as follows. Since opportunistic consumers always rent in these regions,
the only way for the retailer to earn more profit from the opportunistic segment is
through increasing restocking fee, which is evident in πop2 = f + s2 − c. in Case II
(high β, low γ), such a restocking fee increase is possible for the retailer. However, as
γ increases, an increasingly large restocking fee is needed to address the prevalence
of opportunism. At some point, a γ threshold is reached - the sum of restocking fee
and salvage value has become very high relative to price - and it is no longer optimal
to continue to increase the restocking fee. This defines Case III (high β, high γ) - as
long as the retailer is in this region, its price and restocking fee are unaffected by γ.

Impact of the Extent of Opportunism
In this section, we study the profit maximizing response to changes in the extent of
opportunism.
Proposition 2.1. (a) Optimal price is non-increasing in the extent of opportunism.
(b) Optimal restocking fee is non-decreasing in the extent of opportunism.
(c) Moreover,

∂p∗
∂γ

≤

∂f ∗
∂γ

.

We discuss parts (a) and (b) of the Proposition in terms of the regions of the
solution space (Cases I-III) shown in Figure 2.3. First, consider restocking fee. In
Case I and Case II, the retailer should, as expected, always increase restocking fee in
response to more opportunistic consumers. For reasons explained earlier, the retailer
does not adjust restocking fee when both the benefit and extent of opportunism are
high (Case III). In terms of pricing, whenever the retailer increases restocking fee to
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Figure 2.2 Impact of the Extent of Opportunism on Optimal Profit

extract more profit from the opportunistic segment, it needs to decrease price at the
same time in order to offset this cost for ordinary consumers.
The intuition for part (c) follows from this idea of an offsetting price decrease
along with the fact that, at optimality, an ordinary consumer’s probability of keeping
the product is always larger than the probability of returning it. Thus, the negative
utility impact of increased restocking fee can be offset by a price decrease of a lesser
magnitude (since the probability of incurring the price is larger than the probability
of incurring the restocking fee).
b optimal profit
Proposition 2.2. (a) When the benefit of opportunism is low (β < β),

is decreasing in the extent of opportunism, γ.
b optimal profit is U-shaped
(b) When the benefit of opportunism is high (β > β),
√
(s1 −s2 )(9s1 −s2 )+s2
in the extent of opportunism, γ. βb =
− 12 .
2s1

Figure 2.3 provides a visual illustration of the above proposition (c = 0.35, s1 =
0.3, and s2 = 0.15 in that figure). To more clearly explain this finding, we decompose
the profit impact of the extent of opportunism into three parts,
∗

(1 − γ) ∂π∂γor + γ

∗
∂πop
∂γ

∂π ∗
∂γ

=

∗ +γπ ∗ ]
∂[(1−γ)πor
op
∂γ

=

∗
∗
+ (πop
− πor
). The first two parts measure the indirect effects of

γ transmitted by the segment-specific unit profits, while the last part measures the
direct effect of replacing ordinary consumers with opportunistic ones. As γ increases
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from zero, the retailer gradually shifts the focus of its pricing scheme away from the
ordinary segment, evidenced by raising the restocking fee. Therefore, it is intuitive
∗

to see that the unit profit it earns from the ordinary segment is decreasing ( ∂π∂γor <
0), while its unit profit from the opportunistic segment is increasing (

∗
∂πop
∂γ

> 0).

Interestingly, we can show that the weighted average of these two counteracting unit∗

profit effects, (1 − γ) ∂π∂γor + γ

∗
∂πop
,
∂γ

is always zero. It follows that the final effect

of γ – a certain number of ordinary consumers is replaced by the same number of
opportunistic consumers – determines overall effect of γ on optimal profit.
∗
) is always decreasing in the
Since the unit profit from ordinary consumers (πor
∗
extent of opportunism and that from the opportunistic consumers (πop
) is always
∗
∗
increases in γ. That is, switching an opportunistic consumer
− πor
increasing, πop

with an ordinary one is more costly to the retailer when the extent of opportunism
∗
∗
continues to raise. However, whether this negative
− πor
is small. As γ increases, πop

effect can change its sign and turn to a positive one depends on the profitability of the
opportunistic consumers. When the benefit of opportunism (β) is high, opportunistic
consumers are willing to pay a high price to rent the item, which implies that the
retailer is able to profit more from the returns through a high restocking fee. Indeed,
we see that optimal profit can increase with the the opportunistic segment size only
when β is high.
To summarize, opportunistic consumers are always detrimental to the retailer’s
profit when renting is relatively less attractive to them (low β). However, when these
consumers can extract more benefit from renting (high β) and hence become more
profitable to the retailer, an increase in the opportunistic segment has a counterintuitive U-shaped effect on retailer’s profit. In other words, an increase in the extent
of opportunism can increase profits in some cases.
Corollary 2.1. When optimal profit is decreasing in the extent of opportunism, it
decreases at a decreasing rate. That is,

∂ 2 π∗
∂2γ
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> 0 given

∂π ∗
∂γ

< 0.

The above finding makes an interesting practical implication for retailers. Consider the technologies available for identifying individuals who make return claims
at abnormally frequent rates, such as the Verify-2 by Retail Equation Inc. (Speights
and Hilinski, 2005). Employing such tracking technologies, retailers can marginally
reduce the number of opportunistic consumers, γ. Now, assume a retailer’s is in the
region where its profit is negatively affected by γ. Corollary 2.1 provides guidance
into when the marginal benefit of adopting the technology is highest. Specifically, we
find that a reduction in the opportunistic segment size provides the largest payoff
when size of the segment is small. Therefore, when informed by this result, retailers
should adopt a more proactive approach toward combating abusive returns. In other
words, the best timing for investing in the returns tracking technology is, counterintuitively, not when the opportunistic consumer population is considerable but when
it is still limited.

Impact of the Benefit of Opportunism
We now turn our attention to the second aspect of consumer opportunism - the
benefit of opportunism, β. Note that retailers might have some limited influence over
β through adjusting the time duration of the return window – longer windows provide
more opportunity to benefit from an item before returning it. Thus, β is analogous
to γ in the previous section in that, while neither is a firm’s decision variable, both
might be influenced at the margin (β by adjusting the return time window, γ by
implementing consumer tracking technologies). This limited endogeneity makes the
following comparative statics particularly relevant.
Proposition 2.3. The marginal impact of the benefit of opportunism (β) on profit,
∂π ∗
,
∂β

can be either zero or positive or negative:

β+s1 −1
(a) Optimal profit is unaffected by β for β ∈ [1−s1 , 1] and γ ∈ [0, M in[γb , 2β+s
]].
1 −1
2
(b) Optimal profit is increasing in β for β ∈ [ s1s−s
, 1] and γ ∈ [γ, 12 ].
1
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2 )(−1+β)
(c) Optimal profit is decreasing in β otherwise. γ = M ax[ s2(s−s1 −s
, β+s1 −1 ].
1 (1−β)−2s2 β 2β+s1 −1

In comparing Proposition 2.3 with 2.2, it is interesting to note that, while both β
and γ can be considered as measures of the potential negative impact of opportunism,
they affect profit in different ways. Specifically, an increase in the benefit of opportunism, β, has a more nuanced impact – it could be either beneficial or irrelevant
or detrimental to retailer’s profit. Since β to a certain extent is controlled by the
time length of return window, Proposition 2.3 offers interesting insights into when
and how a longer return window exerts an indirect effect on retailer’s profit.
When the extent of opportunism is relatively low (part (a) of Proposition 2.3),
the retailer tailors its return policy more towards the ordinary segment through a low
restocking fee. This low restocking fee, if coupled with a high benefit of opportunism
β, induces the opportunistic consumers to always rent. As long as γ is low, it is not
optimal for the retailer to combat this renting through a higher restocking fee, which
would discourage the ordinary consumers (who make up most of the market) from
buying. As a result, the retailer simply maintains a “static” return policy in this
region (no changes to p or f ) as β increases. This explains, in part (a) of the above
proposition, why β has no impact on optimal profit when β is high and γ is low.
Next, we consider part (b), where both γ and β are high - i.e. many opportunistic
consumers deriving a large utility from renting. In this context, the retailer can tailor
its return policy more towards the opportunistic segment, which is relatively large
and has a high valuation of the rental option. As β increases further, renting becomes
even more appealing, and the retailer can aggressively raise restocking fee f and enjoy
a higher unit profit from the opportunistic segment. The higher restocking fee does
deter ordinary consumers, but the increased profits from the opportunistic segment
more than offset this loss, and the net result is that profits increase.
Lastly, increases in the benefit that consumers receive from opportunistic behavior
never improve firm profits when the extent of opportunism is small. Again, a higher
15

β increases the frequency of abusive behavior in the opportunistic segment. If the
restocking fee is also lenient, the retailer cannot recover the lost of net sales due to an
increased volume of returns. This is exactly what happened in part (c) of the above
proposition.

2.4

Extension: Linking Salvage Value to the Benefit of Opportunism

In the previous section, we make the reasonable assumption that an item returned
by an opportunistic consumer will have a lower salvage value than one returned by
an ordinary consumer. In this section, we refine this aspect of the model by explicitly
linking β to salvage value. Recall that ordinary consumers simply use the trial period
to assess the fit of the product to their needs, while opportunistic consumers use the
product intensively during the trial. By definition, higher-β products can be used more
intensively by opportunistic consumers during the trial, and thus might show more
signs of wear-and-tear than lower-β products, in turn leading to a lower salvage value
(lower s2 ). As mentioned earlier, that a longer time window increases the opportunity
to extract value during the trial period (higher β). In this section we consider the
possibility that it might also lead to a lower salvage value of opportunistic returns.
Our model can be changed to reflect this by simply redefining s1 = s and s2 =
s − βδ. With this setup we retain model parsimony while capturing the idea that
a higher β increases the quality differential between the opportunistic returns and
the ordinary returns. At the same time, s2 is still strictly smaller than s1 , which
preserves the expectation that renting in general reduces salvage value relative to
product evaluation by an ordinary consumer. Details of the analysis of this extension
is in Appendix E. We find that, while all of our previous insights regarding the extent
of opportunism (γ) remain valid, the profit impact of the benefit of opportunism (β)
changes, as detailed in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 2.4. When salvage value is linked to β, the marginal impact of β on
profit,

∂π ∗
,
∂β

can be either positive or negative:

2δ
(a) Optimal profit is increasing in β for β ∈ [ s+δ
, 1] and γ ∈ [ δ(1−β)
, 1 ].
β(s−δ) 2

(b) Optimal profit is decreasing in β otherwise.
Proposition 2.4 differs from Proposition 2.3 when γ is low and β is high (this
context is included in part (b) of Proposition 2.4). When salvage value is linked to
the benefit of opportunism, β exerts a negative impact on profit. This contrasts with
the finding of no profit impact of β in this context with the main model (part (a)
of Proposition 2.3). Recall that when the opportunistic segment size is small, the
retailer implements a low restocking fee. When this low γ is coupled with a high
incentive to rent (high β), it is optimal (in both the main model and this extension)
for the retailer to, in essence “write off” the opportunistic consumers and maintain
a “static” return policy with respect to β (optimal price and restocking fee do not
change with β). Thus, the expected profit from an opportunistic consumer in the
main model is f ∗ + s2 − c , while it is f ∗ + s − βδ − c in this extension. Therefore,
when γ is low and β is high, further increments in β will have a negative impact on
firm profit when salvage value is linked to the benefit of opportunism.

2.5

Conclusion

This chapter contributes to the retail operations literature by incorporating the behavior of opportunistic consumers into a retailer’s optimal return policy decisions.
By incorporating two opportunism-related constructs, extent and benefit of opportunism, into our analytical framework, we provide several counter-intuitive and novel
managerial insights. We first demonstrate that the monopolistic retailer’s optimal
response to an increased number of opportunistic consumers is not always to increase
the restocking fee. When the extent of opportunism is low but the benefit of opportunism is high, it is in fact better to maintain a “static” return policy. We also show
17

that when a restocking fee is necessary, it should always be accompanied by a price
decrease of a smaller magnitude.
My analysis of the profit impact of the extent of opportunism confirms the common expectation that an increase in consumer opportunism will hurt firm profits,
but only when the benefit of opportunism is low. By examining the second order
effects, we refine this conventional wisdom by showing that an increase in the extent
of opportunism has the most detrimental impact on profits when the segment of opportunistic consumers is currently small. More interestingly, we also show that, if the
retail context involves both a high benefit and a high extent of opportunism, the retailer’s optimal profit can actually increase with the size of the opportunistic segment.
This implies that actively working to reduce opportunism might not increase profits
in certain business contexts. Lastly, our analysis of impact of changes in the benefit
of opportunism reveals that its profit impact can be zero, positive, or negative, and
we define the conditions under which each of these is the case. These results suggest
that there are there are cases in which the firm might actually prefer to increase the
benefit of opportunism (e.g. by adjusting the length of the trial period).
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Chapter 3
Using Transactions Data to Improve Consumer
Returns Forecasting and Retailer Practices
3.1

Introduction

In 2010, electronics retailer Best Buy eliminated its 15% restocking fee for consumer
electronics. By offering a more lenient return policy, Best Buy was aligning itself with
the majority of U.S. retailers. Walmart, for example, has long offered a 90 day full
refund policy for most of its products. One consequence of such lenient policies is that
consumer returns, i.e. items that are returned to the retailer for a full refund during
the allowable time window, represent a significant cost in the supply chain1 . They
also present significant operational challenges for both OEMs and retailers, including
how to process and transport returned items, how to staff returns centers, and how
to recover value from returned products via new or existing sales channels.
In the Operations Management area, previous research on consumer returns has
addressed the retailer’s inventory replenishment policy (Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk,
2009), a retailer-manufacturer incentive alignment program designed to reduce the
number of consumer returns (Ferguson et al., 2006), the OEM’s consumer return allocation strategy between selling as refurbished and using for warranty demand (Pince
et al., 2013), and network design for consumer returns (Guide et al., 2006). The
models presented in these papers all share a common element: the requirement of
1

According to a study by Douthit et al. (2011), the cost of consumer returns is between 5% 6% of total revenue for an average Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in 2011.

19

a forecast of the flow of consumer returns. Toktay et al. (2003) report that many
companies rely on simple heuristics for these forecasts, such as multiplying the projected sales by the historical return rate of a product. Our conversations with over
fifteen OEMs during the 2013 Consumer Returns Annual Conference reveal that this
remains the most common choice2 . The returns forecasting literature also provides
little guidance for the consumer returns problem, as it is primarily focused on forecasting the flow of end-of-use/end-of-life returns, for which an OEM might use past
sales history to project returns at the end of the product’s useful life. For consumer
returns, however, retailers often have a potentially powerful resource for predictive
modeling – transaction-level data, which typically contains detailed product and price
information and, potentially, each individual consumer’s previous purchase and return behavior. Despite the fact that retail transactions data is frequently shared with
OEMs for forecasting new product sales (Aviv, 2007), we are not aware of it being
applied to returns forecasting.
Our first contribution in this study is that we explore the power of transactionlevel retail data to improve the accuracy of consumer returns forecasting. In doing
so, we make a contribution to the theory of returns forecasting by addressing two
econometric challenges specific to the behavior of consumers in a retail return context.
First, consumers differ in how certain they are about their valuations of a product
before they make a purchase. During the trial period (i.e. return time window), each
consumer sufficiently experiences the product and adjusts her valuation accordingly,
and the scale of this adjustment is likely to be larger for those with more initial
uncertainty. This heterogeneous nature of trial uncertainty makes incorporating nonconstant error variance necessary. Secondly, consumers also differ in how long it takes
them to sufficiently experience a given product. Of course, the retailer cannot observe
2

In fact, none of the OEMs we talked to suggest that their returns forecasting is conducted with
retail transactions data. A list of the OEMs and retailers who attended this conference is available
at www.wbresearch.com/consumerreturnsusa/home.aspx.
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this duration for the products that are not returned, so the only available data on
trial duration is for the products that are returned. Any estimation based solely
on this “selected” sample introduces bias. We address both of these methodological
challenges by constructing an econometric model that simultaneously accounts for
non-constant error variance and sample selection bias.
Our second contribution is that we use our econometric results to provide guidance for retailers’ consumer returns management. Some retailers have attempted to
actively influence the volume of consumer returns through buyer assistance programs
and/or by adjusting the return time window. The goal of the former is to reduce the
probability of a return by helping customers locate the most suitable product, while
the latter is meant to reduce both the number and average age of returns. For buyer
assistance programs, the cost justification depends heavily on: 1) where a product is
in its life-cycle and thus how familiar consumers are likely to be with it, and 2) how
product assortment causes consumers to be less certain about their product choices.
Our model enables us to empirically investigate the affect of these two factors on
the probability that a product will be returned, and thus to suggest some guidance
regarding the focus of buyer assistance. For the return time window, retailers often
set a single policy uniformly across all returns, e.g. 30, 60, or 90 days after the day
of purchase. This rule-of-thumb approach, while simple to understand by consumers,
ignores the fact that some products take longer to evaluate than others. Using our
econometric model we empirically investigate the relationship between product type
and the length of time required for customers to determine their post-purchase utility.
Using data provided by a major U.S. consumer electronics retailer, we apply our
econometric model to 20,801 transactions of 2,483 products. A summary of our
main results is as follows. First, our causal model based forecasting approach is, on
average, 20% to 40% more accurate than a variety of benchmark models that do
not factor in the retailers’ transaction data. This improvement in accuracy is largely
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sustained even when only month and category dummy variables are included, which
constitutes a very parsimonious and widely available set of explanatory variables.
Second, we provide guidance for buyer assistance programs by showing how factors
such as product variety and product maturity are correlated with the probability of
a product being returned. These findings enable retailers to better allocate scarce
resources within their buyer assistance programs. Third, we provide guidance for
setting the return time windows by deriving a set of reference policies based on our
finding that different types of products require different lengths of time for consumers
to sufficiently experience them and make an assessment of fit. Finally, we empirically
validate the assumption made in Shulman et al. (2009, 2011) that trial uncertainty
is convexly decreasing in product variety.

3.2

Literature Review

Our study is closely related to two emerging literature streams, managing consumer
returns and product returns forecasting. In the first stream, most previous studies
have an analytical focus on deriving the optimal return policies under different circumstances. Examples include Akçay et al. (2013), Shulman et al. (2009, 2011), and
Su (2009), as well as the model presented in the last chapter. The current study
empirically tests one key assumption made in this literature – that more product
variety leads to lower trial uncertainty. On the empirical side, Anderson et al. (2009)
contrasts an econometric model that incorporates consumer’s buy-return sequential
decisions to the conventional purchase incident model. They demonstrate how the
model could be used to estimate the optional value of a full refund policy. Petersen
and Kumar (2009) hypothesize and empirically confirm that consumers’ past return
volume links positively to their future purchase volume. In a different context, Griffis
et al. (2012) show that consumers who returned in the past tend to order more frequently, put more items in an order, and buy more expensive items than those who
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never returned. Our research extends this line of discourse by demonstrating that past
return behavior is a also good predictor of future return behavior. Thus, customers
with past returns may not be as profitable as previously conjectured.
The return forecasting literature has a predominant emphasis on end-of-use returns. Toktay et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive review of these studies. While
Toktay et al. (2000) examine the case of Kodak’s single-use cameras, Clottey et al.
(2012) expand on this work by considering alternative distributions for the return
lag. Li et al. (2011) apply count regression techniques to forecast trade-in returns in
a business-to-business context. Despite this extensive literature on end-of-use returns
forecasting, to our knowledge the problem of forecasting consumer returns has not
been addressed in the literature. In contrast to OEMs, who typically have only aggregated period-level sale and return data available, retailers often collect transactionlevel data through Point-of-Sale (POS) technologies and loyalty programs, resulting
in a rich data set for returns forecasting. While not their main focus, Hess and Mayhew (1997) is the only work that shows potential of utilizing transactions data to
predict consumer returns flow. Specifically, they use price and product category to
estimate, for each transaction, the probability of a return and the time lag until a
return. We take the additional step to aggregate these two pieces of information into
a forecast of consumer returns flow (discussed in detail in Section 3.5). Furthermore,
our econometric model can be viewed as a more flexible model that includes Hess
and Mayhew (1997) as a special case, and we show the forecasting capability of both
approaches. While our full econometric model generates 20% to 40% more accurate
forecasts than traditional time-series forecasting techniques, their approach captures
around two thirds of this accuracy gain.
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3.3

The Econometric Model

Consider a consumer who purchases an experience product from a retailer, which
is recorded by the retailer as transaction i. Before purchasing the product, assume
the consumer’s utility of the product is µi + vi , where µi is common knowledge to
both the consumer and the retailer, while vi is the consumer’s private knowledge, not
observed by the retailer. The product trial, i.e. the post-purchase product evaluation
by the consumer, is modeled as follows. After yi days of experiencing the product, the
consumer adjusts her utility by τi such that her post-trial utility is di = µi + vi + τi .
There are multiple reasons that the trial uncertainty, or the variance of the trial
experience, V (τi ), might vary across transactions. First V (τi ) should be larger when
a product is in the early stages of its life-cycle, since publicly available product information such as consumer reviews becomes more abundant as a product matures.
Second, V (τi ) should be larger when there are fewer competing products, since a lack
of alternatives makes it more difficult for a consumer to ascertain whether a product
is the best fit for her needs (Shulman et al. 2009, 2011). Third, V (τi ) should be
larger when transactions occur during the holiday season (November and December),
since products purchased during this time are more likely to be gifts and evaluating
what others might like is more difficult than choosing the best product for oneself.
Fourth, there could be category-specific variations in trial uncertainty, since products
in different categories (televisions, cameras, computers, etc.) are quite different in
terms of how easily and accurately their fit can be assessed. We elaborate on the
above points further in Section 3.4 and test each one empirically in Section 3.6.
Note that both vi and τi are not observable to the retailer so they will collapse into
a single error term in estimation. We denote the collapsed error by εi and assume
it follows a normal distribution with first and second moments equal to 0 and σi2 .
The transaction specific variance, σi2 , allows us to explicitly model the heterogeneity
in product trial uncertainty. So, di can be rewritten as di = µi + εi . Let ri be the
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cost of a return, which includes both the restocking fee and any perceived return
hassle. If di − ri > 0, the consumer keeps the purchased item. If di − ri < 0,
she returns it to the retailer. Hence, whether or not a product is returned can be
modeled using a heteroskedastic probit regression. Since only full refunds appear
in our data, ri degenerates into a constant term that captures perceived hassle of
return. In estimation, this constant collapses with the constant in µi , so we drop ri
to simplify notation3 . The retailer records the consumer’s return behavior through a
binary variable Ii , Ii = 1 for returns and Ii = 0 for non-returns.
Next, we turn to the duration of experience, yi . We make the common assumption
that it follows a Weibull distribution4 . Let yi = λi ui , where ui is a standard Weibull
distributed error term with duration dependence parameter ζ and λi is a scale function
that allows experience duration to depend on exogenous factors such as product
category and seasonality. This setup of yi is referred to as Accelerated Failure Time
(AFT) in the survival analysis literature. Strictly speaking, yi is the consumer’s
private knowledge, but the retailer may approximate yi using the time lag between
purchase and return.
Since experience duration is observed only when an item is returned, estimating
the parameters in λi using only return transactions may result in biased estimates.
This issue is called non-random sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979), which arises
due to the correlation between εi and ui . We do not have a priori expectation on the
directionality of this bias because there are reasonable arguments for both positive
and negative correlation. For example, consumers who face “buyer’s remorse” might
be more likely to return the product and also be more likely to end the product trial
early (a positive correlation between εi and ui ). On the other hand, a perfectionist
3

Price is already included in µi . A restocking fee variable could also be included in µi if this fee
varies across transactions.
4
Clottey et al. (2012) apply an exponential distribution, which nests within Weibull as a special
case, while Toktay et al. (2000) use a discrete analog of the exponential distribution.
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might spend a long time testing the product, while her perfectionism might also cause
even small mismatches between her expectations and the product’s functionality to
result in a product return (a negative correlation between εi and ui ). Thus, to
obtain consistent estimates, we simultaneously model yi and di and, more importantly,
explicitly incorporate their conditional correlation.
Note that the conventional setup of a sample selection model that utilizes a bivariate normal distribution is not appropriate for our context because we need one
marginal distribution of the bivariate distribution to be Weibull. Previous research
of non-normal selection models, such as the pioneering work by Lee (1983), uses copula theory to construct flexible bivariate distributions. We adopt a simple form of
the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula family (Kotz et al., 2004; Smith, 2003). The
bivariate probability density function (PDF) is as follows:
fy,d (yi , di ) = fy (yi )fd (di ){1 + θ[2Fy (yi ) − 1][2Fd (di ) − 1]}
y

−( λi )ζ

The marginal PDFs are fy (yi ) = ( yζi )( λyii )ζ e

i

and fd (di ) =

(3.1)

1
i
φ( diσ−u
).
σi
i

marginal Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) are Fy (yi ) = 1 − e

y
−( λi )ζ
i

The
and

i
) where θ measures the correlation between yi and di and falls in the
Fd (di ) = Φ( diσ−u
i

interval −1 < θ < 1.
The above specification has three appealing features. First, θ has the same
directional interpretation as the more familiar Pearson’s correlation coefficient, ρ.
That is, a positive θ means that realizations of yi and di on the same side of their
respective medians will appear more frequently, whereas a negative θ indicates a
higher chance of yi and di appearing on the opposite side of their respective medians. In addition, the transformation from θ to ρ is fairly straightforward. ρ =
R

θ

Fy (yi )[1−Fy (yi )]dyi

√

R

Fd (di )[1−Fd (di )]ddi

V ar(yi )V ar(di )

. Second, selection models derived from the FGM

copula family have been reported to have a reasonable speed of convergence in estimation (Boehmke et al., 2006; Prieger, 2002). Third, when applied to duration data,
using FGM copula to connect a Weibull and a normal distribution has been shown to
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outperform Lee (1983) approach, where a transformed bivariate normal distribution
is used (Prieger, 2002).
With the bivariate distribution on hand, we can now construct the likelihood
function. The commonly used two-stage estimator presented in (Heckman, 1979) is
not applicable to our problem because the regression equation for yi is not linear in
λi (Lee, 1983). Instead, we develop a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
estimator. The retailer confronts two types of data: (1) an item is not returned
(Ii = 0) and (2) an item is returned (Ii = 1) yi days after purchase. The likelihood
of observing the first type is given by
Pr(Ii = 0) = Pr(di > 0) = Pr(εi > −µi ) = Φ(

µi
)
σi

(3.2)

The likelihood of observing the second type is obtained by integrating the joint density
function fy,d (yi , di ) over the relevant range of di .
Pr(Ii = 1, yi ) = Pr(εi < −µi , yi ) =

Z 0
−∞

fy,d (yi , di )ddi

(3.3)

µi
µi
){1 + θ[1 − Φ(− )][2Fy (yi ) − 1]}
σi
σi
y
ζ yi ζ −( λyi )ζ
µi
µi
−( i )ζ
= ( )( ) e i Φ(− ){1 + θΦ( )[1 − 2e λi ]}
yi λi
σi
σi

= fy (yi )Φ(−

Taking Equation 3.2 and 3.3 together, we are able to describe the log likelihood of
observing the whole sample as follows:
ln L =

n
X

{(1 − Ii ) ln[Pr(Ii = 0)] + Ii ln[Pr(Ii = 1, yi )]}

(3.4)

i=1

The FIML estimator produced by maximizing Equation 3.4 is asymptotically consistent. Its finite sample performance is examined through a Monte Carlo simulation,
which is available upon request. Within the framework of our simulation, we find the
estimator to have little bias and to produce estimates considerably closer to the true
parameters than a model not accounting for sample selectivity.
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3.4

Data and Variables

As an effort to promote quality empirical research, the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) encourages scholars to publish
unique and comprehensive data sets. The outcomes of this effort include a hotel booking data set (Bodea et al., 2009) and a multiechelon supply chain data set (Willems,
2008) published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, as well as a
durable consumer electronics data set in Marketing Science (Ni et al., 2012) . Four
features of the last data set make it especially appealing for applying our econometric
model. First, studies of experience goods are often conducted in the context of consumer electronics (see Gu et al. (2012) and Obloj and Capron (2011) for examples).
Second, our model requires transaction-level data, and Ni et al. (2012) suggest that
theirs is, by far, the most comprehensive data set of consumer electronics transactions
available. Third, researchers are specifically encouraged to work on product return
issues with the Ni et al. (2012) data5 . Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the
retailer in this data set employs a extremely generous time window policy for returns
– the longest return lag in the data is 251 days, and there are several others that took
place more than 150 days after purchase. Such leniency in the return time window
permits estimating consumers’ experience duration without truncation issues.
The original data contains 173,262 transactions provided by a major U.S. electronics chain, the identity of which, for confidentiality reasons, is not provided. All
returns at this retailer are accepted open-box and given a full refund. The transactions in this data set took place between December 1998 and November 2004. We have
limited our attention to the subset of the original data that is applicable to our context. Information goods (CDs, DVDs, books, etc.), accessories (SD cards, batteries,
cords, etc.), and services were excluded since these are fundamentally different from
5

More information could be found at the journal’s website www.informs.org/Community/ISMS
and in Ni et al. (2012).
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durable electronics. Records for which the product description is missing/ambiguous
are also excluded, as are records that do not indicate if/when the purchased item
was returned. Finally, when this data set was gathered, on-line transactions were
a very small fraction (less than 1%) of this retailer’s sales. Therefore, we are not
in a position to investigate differences between on-line and in-store return behavior,
and so the on-line transactions are eliminated as well. This leaves us with 20,638
transactions across 2,481 different products.
The products in our data can be broadly divided into the six categories in Table
3.1. Overall return rates fluctuate around 10%, with the audio speaker category
being the highest (15.15%) and major appliances being the lowest (5.58%). The
longest average return lag is for digital video systems (16.85 days), while the shortest
is for major appliances (7.41 days). In the following section we discuss how each
variable in our model is coded.
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Product Categories
Category
Audio Speaker
Imaging Equipment1
Major Appliance2
Computer3
Television
Digital Video System4

Return Lag
14.28
11.85
7.41
10.41
11.92
16.85

Return Rate
15.15%
10.98%
5.58%
8.03%
7.17%
12.19%

Products
301
381
160
325
746
568

1

Imaging equipment include camcorders, cameras, camera lenses, etc.

2

Major appliances include kitchen appliances, washers and dryers.

3

Computers include laptop, desktop, monitor, printer, scanner, etc.

4

Digital Video System includes HD boxes, DVD players, etc.

Obs.
1558
2085
394
3499
5899
7203

Dependent Variables
The two dependent variables in Equation(3.4) are Ii , a dummy variable for return,
and yi , experience duration. Coding for Ii is straightforward: Ii = 1 for the returns
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and Ii = 0 for the non-returns. Because yi is visible only in a sample of returned
transactions, its empirical manifest is essentially return lag – the time difference between purchase and return. The histogram of return lag shows proximity to the
shape of an exponential or Weibull distribution. In addition, the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard plot (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002) exhibits a descending slope as
yi increases, contradicting the exponential distribution’s constant slope pattern. This
provides further “informal” evidence for the use of the more general Weibull distribution rather than the exponential. A formal statistical test is presented in Table 3.6
(ζ is significantly different from 1).

Independent Variables
The selection regression di = µi +εi calls for two sets of predictors, one for the mean µi
and the other for the standard deviation σi of the error term. As discussed in Section
3.3, we expect that σi might differ across transactions. Modeling of the categorical
and monthly effects is straightforward using dummy variables. The effects of product maturity and variety, however, require further discussion given their theoretical
importance.
Product maturity (M aturityi ), or a product’s length of existence on the market,
is a measure of the product’s available public information. As Nelson (1970) pointed
out, all products are located somewhere on the search-experience spectrum. A particular product’s position depends on the consumers’ sources of information acquisition.
If external sources such as advertising, expert opinion, and word of mouth provide
vivid descriptions of the product, consumers tend to acquire information by “searching” these sources. When this information is available, a consumer is able to learn
more about the product prior to purchase, so her idiosyncratic uncertainty at the
time of purchase is lower. On the contrary, if public information regarding a product
is relatively scarce or hard to access, consumers must rely on their own experience
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to determine its value, and thus idiosyncratic uncertainty is higher. One important
factor that shifts a product’s position on the search-experience spectrum is its length
of existence. For example, comparing a newly introduced television model with one
that has been on the market for several months, the amount of publicly available
information (e.g. expert reviews, consumer reviews, defect rates, etc.) is much more
abundant for the latter (Kalish, 1985). The accumulation of publicly available product information over time is even more apparent with the popularization of consumer
forums and on-line recommendation systems (Dimoka et al., 2012). In general, as
a product becomes more mature in the market, more information will be disclosed
through various sources (Ghosh and Galbreth, 2013) and hence its value could be
more precisely gauged without hands-on “experience”. Therefore, consumers’ trial
uncertainty of a more mature product is expected to be lower. M aturityi is operationalized by differencing the time (in months) of the focal transaction and the first
transaction for the same product. For example, 12 transactions are documented in
our data set for a certain digital camera. If the 5th transaction was recorded on
July 2002 and the first transaction of this camera was observed on February 2002,
the maturity at the time of the 5th transaction is 5 months. Since we expect that
the uncertainty reduction effect of maturity is stronger for newer products, a squared
term, (M aturityi )2 , is also included in σi .
The number of competing alternatives, (V arietyi ), also impacts trial uncertainty
since comparing products with heterogeneous design attributes could help consumers
locate the one that better matches their preferences. With more similar products
being offered, customers can more easily assess their fit, which in turn reduces their
reliance on experience. However, this relationship between product variety and trial
uncertainty is not likely to be linear. As demonstrated by Kahn (1998) and Lehmann
(1998), it becomes increasingly hard for consumers to realize the incremental benefit
that each additional product represents. This convexly negative relationship between
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product variety and trial uncertainty is assumed in the analytical models of Shulman
et al. (2009, 2011). Our analysis enables us to test this assumption empirically. Since
our data includes a detailed product categorization scheme, we are able to define competing products. For example, products within the television category are grouped
by screen size and features. For transaction i, V arietyi is the number of all other
products sold in the same subcategory in the same month as transaction i. To account
for the non-linear effect of V arietyi , we also include its squared term, (V arietyi )2 .
Following the standard treatment of conditional heteroskedasticity (White, 1980), we
parameterize σi as an exponential function of the above covariates.
σi = exp[δ1 M aturityi + δ2 V arietyi + δ3 (M aturityi )2 + δ4 (V arietyi )2
+

X

δCategoryi +

X

δM onthi ]

(3.5)

In the mean function, µi , we include a list of potential predictors for return probability. Among them, the number of returns made in the past (P ast_returni ) is
of theoretical interest. It has been shown in prior studies that past return behavior
correlates with both the dollar amount and the frequency of future purchases (Griffis
et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2002). In contrast, our interest is whether past return
behavior can predict future return behavior. Chircu and Mahajan (2006) classified
the costs involved in buyer-seller interaction into price-type costs, time-type costs,
and psychological-type costs. Consumers who have never made a return may feel
hesitant to make the first return, incurring a psychological-type cost. Inexperienced
consumers might also inherently possess higher time-type costs. For example, the
higher opportunity cost of making a return trip could have filtered them into the
inexperienced category initially. In sum, we believe consumers without return experience perceive higher costs of making a return, which implies a stronger intention
to keep the purchased item. Thus, return experience should positively predict return probability. For the consumer who made transaction i, we count the number of
products she has returned in the past, denoted P ast_returni .
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Other predictors of return probability included in the model are P opularityi ,
Other_purchasei , P ast_purchasei , P ast_visiti , Avg_pricei , and P urchase_pricei .
Since consumers may assign a higher value to a more popular product, making it
less likely to be returned, we include P opularityi , calculated as the product’s average
number of monthly transactions. Since buying more than needed may lead to remorse
and thus a higher likelihood of return, we include Other_purchasei , calculated as
the total dollar value of other items in the same receipt. Since past purchases might
reflect a consumer’s loyalty to the retailer, which might in turn affect the intention
to return, we include P ast_purchasei , calculated as the aggregate value of items
purchased by the consumer in the past six months. Since frequent visitors have more
planned trips to the retailer and hence have lower opportunity cost of return, we include P ast_visiti , calculated as the consumer’s frequency of transactions in the past
six months. Since Hess et al. (1996) found that more expensive items are more likely
to be returned, we include Avg_pricei , calculated as the mean of all transactions
of a certain product. Finally, to capture the impact of within-product price fluctuation, we include P urchase_pricei , calculated as the percentage difference between
the price of transaction i and Avg_pricei for the same product. Other_purchasei ,
P ast_purchasei , and Avg_pricei are scaled by 1000 for easier presentation of the
coefficients.
Finally, to reliably estimate the δ coefficients in Equation(3.5), we include the
same variables in µi . In summary, the mean utility function is parameterized as
follows.
µi = γ0 + γ1 P opularityi + γ2 M aturityi + γ3 V arietyi + γ4 (M aturityi )2
+γ5 (V arietyi )2 + γ6 Other_purchase + γ7 P ast_purchase + γ8 P ast_visit
+γ9 P ast_return + γ10 Avg_price + γ11 P urchase_price
+

X

γCategoryi +

X

(3.6)

γM onthi
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The duration regression yi = λi ui calls for one set of predictors for the scale parameter λi . Potential predictors of duration include month (e.g. since Holiday purchases
might be gifts and thus not be evaluated as quickly after purchase) and category (e.g.
since the effort to evaluate a product might differ by category). In addition, popular and/or mature products might have more abundant public information available,
reducing the role of hands-on experience in product evaluation. Finally, since more
variety means a larger pool of back-up choices, the decision to terminate the product
trial might be easier. In summary, M onthi , Categoryi , P opularityi , M aturityi , and
V arietyi are included, and λi is parameterized as follows.
λi = exp(β0 + β1 P opularityi + β2 M aturityi + β3 V arietyi
+

X

βCategoryi +

X

βM onthi )

(3.7)

Descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables are provided in
Table 3.2. Methodological studies of sample selection models (see Puhani (2000) and
Vella (1998) for reviews) have advised that model identification can be improved by
including exogenous predictors in the selection equation that do not belong to the
outcome equation. Our specifications of µi and λi closely follow this advice as the
former contains all variables in the latter plus additional covariates. Among those
additional covariates, Avg_pricei is shown by Hess and Mayhew (1997) to affect the
choice of return but not the time of return.

3.5

Return Forecasting

Due to heterogeneity in experience duration, the total number of returns (Rt ) in a
given time period t could be partitioned into two parts, those attributed to sales from
previous time periods (Rp,t ) and those attributed to sales in the current time period
(Rc,t ). That is, Rt = Rp,t + Rc,t . The common practice in industry as well as the
focus of previous literature is to use period-level sales and/or return data to directly
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent
Variables
Variable
Popularity
Maturity
Variety
Other_purchase
Past_purchase
Past_visit
Past_return
Avg_price
Purchase_price
N

Mean
2.44
4.87
16.84
0.35
0.27
0.72
0.68
0.29
0

Std. Dev. Min.
3.94
0
5.03
0
10.43
1
0.69
0
0.76
0
1.36
0
1.71
0
0.28
0.02
0.1
-0.88
20638

Max.
56
45
62
12.56
20.23
22
28
5.12
1.05

predict Rt . In contrast, we exploit the rich information contained in transaction-level
retailer data that is available through the retailer’s POS systems. However, at the
end of period t − 1, the retailer only has transactional information on periods prior to
period t, which implies that our econometric model can only predict Rp,t . To make a
meaningful comparison between our forecasting approach and the existing ones, there
are two options. The first and more straightforward option is to compare the forecasts
of Rp,t . However, this ignores the fact that the quantity of interest in practice is Rt .
The second option compares Rt predicted by a benchmark model with the sum of Rp,t
predicted by our econometric model and Rc,t predicted by the same benchmark. As
a result, this option requires a set of pair-wise comparisons, the number of which is
the same as the number of benchmarks. To ensure a close tie to practice, we proceed
with the second option.
Before introducing the specifics of our benchmark and focal models, we discuss
how period-level variables are generated from the original data set. Past research and
our interactions with practitioners indicate that firms perform return forecasting on
a weekly to a monthly basis. Thus, the duration of a period is specified as either one
week, two weeks, or one month. We calculate sales quantity, Qt , along with Rt , Rp,t ,
and Rc,t for each period. The complete sample of our data has a time span of six
35

years, and we reserve the last two years as the prediction sample. The exact number
of periods for each specification along with other descriptive statistics are provided
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Description of Period-Level Data
Length of t Total Periods (T )
one week
313 periods
two weeks
156 periods
one month
72 periods

Predict Sample
104 periods
52 periods
24 periods

Avg. Qt
65.93
131.97
286.64

Avg. Rt
6.61
13.26
28.72

Avg. RRp,tt
68.05%
52.44%
35.67%

A concern with the approach described above is that there is only one replication
for each length of time period we study. To test the robustness of our results, we create
four additional replication samples. First, the entire six-year data set is randomly split
into four parts, each containing roughly one fourth of the original data. Second, we
omit the parts one at a time to construct four subsamples: Subsample 1 – Subsample
4. Third, we calculate Qt , Rt , Rp,t , and Rc,t for every subsample, where t is weekly,
biweekly, and monthly. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.4. As expected,
Qt and Rt are roughly three-fourth of those in Table 3.3.
Table 3.4 Description of Period-Level Data in Replication Samples

Length of t
one week
two weeks
one month
Length of t
one week
two weeks
one month

Subsample
Avg Qt Avg Rt
49.51
4.96
99.10
9.96
215.26
21.56
Subsample
Avg Qt Avg Rt
49.23
4.85
98.56
9.72
214.07
21.06

1
Avg RRp,tt
68.06%
52.61%
35.31%
3
Avg RRp,tt
68.03%
52.29%
36.21%

Subsample
Avg Qt Avg Rt
49.49
5.02
99.07
10.06
215.18
21.79
Subsample
Avg Qt Avg Rt
49.55
5.01
98.56
10.04
215.40
21.76

2
Avg RRp,tt
68.73%
53.33%
34.88%
4
Avg RRp,tt
67.39%
51.52%
36.19%

Next, we introduce the setup of the benchmark models and the forecast produced
by our econometric model. To simplify exposition, we assume that the length of a
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period is one week. Full extension to the biweekly and monthly cases is provided in
the Appendix F. The benchmark models incorporate a seasonality component in the
monthly case.
Benchmark 1: Baseline Model. The first benchmark does not employ any formal
statistical modeling. Since Rt is essentially a fraction of the total sales (Qt ) in period
t, it can be estimated as the product of the average past return rate and the sales
c ). Because forecasting demand is not the focus here, we replace Q
c with
forecast (Q
t
t

Qt :
t−1
Rt−j
1 X
Baseline
) × Qt
=
(
R\
t
t − 1 j=1 Qt−j

(3.8)

The above specification gives the baseline model a considerable advantage. Therefore,
its de facto forecasting accuracy should be much lower than what we show.
Benchmark 2: Exponential Smoothing Model. Because we do not see an obvious
upward or downward trend in Rt , a simple exponential smoothing model is used. The
second benchmark is as follows.
Smoothing
\ = αR + (1 − α)RSmoothing
\
Rp,t
t−1
t−1

(3.9)

where α is the smoothing parameter. The starting value of the smoothing series,
\ , is set to the actual returns of period 1, R .
R1Smoothing
1
Benchmark 3: ARIMA Model. Before fitting an ARIMA(p,d,q) model to our
data, we first need to determine the appropriate number of parameters. As no trend
is detected, d is set to zero. Analyzing the correlogram and partial correlogram, we
count the number of significant moving average lags (5) and autoregressive lags (1).
Then, we fit 5 × 1 different ARIMA models. A Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)
is recorded for each model and the model with the lowest BIC value is chosen, in our
case ARIMA(1,0,1).
ARIM A
R\
= α0 + α1 Rt−1 + α2 et−1 + et
t
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(3.10)

Benchmark 4: Lagged Sales Model. In this benchmark, we adopt the technique
from Toktay et al. (2000) – regressing current returns on past sales. The rationale is
that a given proportion, αj , of transactions made j periods prior to t will be returned
in period t. Thus, αj Qt−j is period t − j’s contribution to Rt . A central question
for this approach is how far to look back, i.e. how large j should be. The answer to
this question marks the contextual difference between our study and the literature.
The empirical context of Toktay et al. (2000) is a remanufacturer collecting end-ofuse returns, which have an estimated mean return lag of 2 months. Additionally,
(De Brito and Dekker, 2003, p.237) suggest that returns continue to take place even
two years after sales for some industrial materials. In comparison, we are examining
consumer returns received by a retailer, which typically have a short return lag.
While the mean return lag in our data is 2 weeks, its 99th percentile is 126 days or 18
weeks. Therefore, it is enough to include Qt−1 through Qt−18 as regressors. Adding
an intercept, the lagged sales model is as follows.
18

X
LagSales
αj Qt−j + et
R\
= α0 +
t

(3.11)

j=1

When forecasting, we drop the insignificant αj coefficients to avoid poor forecasts due
to over-fitting. The above model estimates at most nineteen αj s and the variance of
et . The total consumption of twenty degrees of freedom is reasonable considering the
size of our estimation sample6 . Thus, we are exempted from making distributional
assumptions on the α coefficients as in Toktay et al. (2000).
Benchmark 5: ARIMAX Model. We combine the two benchmarks above to formulate a lagged sales model with ARMA(1,1) error structure. Such temporal regression
belongs to the ARIMAX model family in the time series literature.
\AX = α0 +
RtARIM

18
X

αj Qt−j + κt , where κt = α19 κt−1 + α20 et−1 + et

(3.12)

j=1
6
To make the first prediction, we have 313 − 100 = 213 data points. The lagged sales go back
18 periods, which reduces 18 more observations. Each subsequent prediction will have one more
observation available as historical data.
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Similar to (3.11), we drop the insignificant αj coefficients to avoid poor forecasts due
to over-fitting.
The above five benchmarks exploit period-level data to different degrees. While
the baseline model produces a naïve forecast simply using the historical average, the
ARIMAX model incorporates past return and sales data in a fairly sophisticated
fashion. These five benchmarks represent the forecasting methodology either used in
the industry or available in the literature. They also are representative of what OEMs
can reasonably do to forecast product returns in the absence of having transactions
data from the retailer. Next, we derive a return forecast using our econometric model.
Focal Model: Partial I, Partial II, and Full. As discussed earlier, our econometric
model predicts Rp,t , the number of returns attributed to the previous periods’ sales.
To make a tight connection to the literature and ensure practicality for retailers, we
parameterize our econometric model in three ways, which leads to three versions of
d.
R
p,t

As discussed in the literature review, the empirical model of Hess and Mayhew
(1997) may be used to forecast the flow of product returns. For a given purchase,
Hess and Mayhew (1997) predict both the probability that a product will be returned
(using price and product category7 as explanatory variables) and the time lag until a
return occurs (using price as an explanatory variable). However, they do not consider
heteroskedasticity and do not correct for sample selection bias. To closely match their
specification, we include product category dummies in λi and transaction prices in
d is denoted
both λi and µi , while constraining σi to 1 and θ to 0. This version of R
p,t

as Partial I.
We acknowledge that the wealth of transactional data used in our full model might
not always be available, either because it is not collected by the retailer or because
7

Hess and Mayhew (1997) classified products into three broad types – low fit, medium fit, and
high fit. Since the exact classification criteria are not discussed, we instead use dummy variables for
product category.
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the forecasting is being done by an OEM with whom all of the retailer’s transactional
d,
data is not shared. To address this practical concern, we present two versions of R
p,t

Partial II and Full. In the Partial II setup, only category and month dummies are
included in λi , µi , and σi . In the Full setup, a complete parameterization of λi , µi ,
and σi as in (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) is used. While Partial II serves to examine the
forecasting capability of our econometric model with minimal data input, the Full
setup provides insights into the additional predictive value of other variables.
d are joined with the R forecasts estimated by
Next, the three versions of R
p,t
c,t
c =R
d +R
d , to construct pair-wise comparisons.
the five benchmarks, such that R
t
p,t
c,t
Smoothing
\ , R\
Baseline
ARIM A
Replacing Rt with Rc,t in (3.8) - (3.12), we obtain R\
, Rc,t
,
c,t
c,t
LagSales
ARIM
\AX . Then, we calculate R
d using our econometric model in five
R\
, and Rc,t
p,t
c,t

steps.
1. Denote for each transaction the date of sale as datesale
and for each period the
i
and dateend
starting date and ending date as datestart
t .
t
2. Run the maximum likelihood estimation in (3.4) using all the transactions made
on or before 126 days prior to datestart
. Omitting the final 126 days ensures
t
that the retailer has return lag data available on all the transactions used for
estimation.
3. Among the transactions made between 126 days prior to datestart
and datestart
,
t
t
denote by Nt the total number of those that have not been returned yet.
4. Calculate for each transaction in Nt the probability of the product being returned between datestart
and dateend
given that it is not returned before datestart
.
t
t
t
For transaction i, this probability is Pr(di < 0, a < yi < b|di > 0 ∪ yi > a),

40

sale
where a = datestart
−datesale
and b = dateend
. Using (3.1), we have
t
i
t −datei

Pr(di < 0, a < yi < b|di > 0 ∪ yi > a)
Pr(di < 0, yi < b) − Pr(di < 0, yi < a)
1 − Pr(di < 0, yi < a)
Rb R0
Ra R0
−∞ −∞ fy,d (yi , di )ddi dyi − −∞ −∞ fy,d (yi , di )ddi dyi
=
Ra R0
1 − −∞
−∞ fy,d (yi , di )ddi dyi
=

(3.13)

d , in period t. Because each
5. Calculate the expected number of returns, R
p,t

transaction in Nt has a non-zero chance of being returned in period t and
these probabilities are not equal, the total number of returns follows a Poissonbinomial distribution. Its mean is the sum of Nt Bernoulli probabilities, or
d =
R
p,t

Nt
X

Pr(di < 0, a < yi < b|di > 0 ∪ yi > a)

(3.14)

i=1

All models, focal and benchmark, are estimated after each time period to allow
for incorporation of the latest sale, return, and transaction information. We employ
two prediction accuracy measures for evaluating the relative forecasting capability of
different models. The mean absolute deviation (MAD) reflects the average bias of
forecasts:

M AD =

T
1X
c −R |
|R
t
t
T t=1

(3.15)

while the mean squared error (MSE) penalizes the large errors more severely:
M SE =

T
1X
c − R )2
(R
t
t
T t=1

(3.16)

All benchmark models are estimated using STATA’s existing routines, “tssmooth”
for exponential smoothing, “arima” for ARIMA and ARIMAX, and "regress" for
lagged sales. The econometric model is programed with STATA’s ml language. A
summary of the pair-wise comparisons between the benchmark and focal models is
presented in Table 3.5. The detailed results of each forecasting approach are available
upon request.
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Table 3.5 Average Forecast Accuracy Improvements

Benchmark
Baseline
Smoothing
ARIMA
Lagged Sales
ARIMAX

Partial I
MAD MSE
13% 36%
18% 29%
14% 26%
13% 17%
3%
10%

Focal Model
Partial II
MAD MSE
20% 41%
23% 36%
20% 33%
20% 27%
10% 19%

Full
MAD MSE
19%
41%
26%
41%
23%
38%
21%
30%
15%
25%

The numbers show average improvements made by focal models over
benchmarks across 15 cases.

Table 3.5 shows clear evidence for the improved performance of our model relative
to the benchmark models. Recall that we have varied time length per period and sample composition to construct 15 cases for comparison. All the benchmarks together
only outperform our model in one of these 15 instances. Specifically, in Subsample
4 of the one-month-per-period case, the ARIMAX model has a lower forecasting error. Moreover, the accuracy gain from our model is substantial. Comparing with
the various benchmarks, our model consistently achieves 20% lower MAD and 35%
lower MSE. While all models exhibit diminishing forecasting accuracy as the prediction horizon increases from one week to one month, our model sustains an impressive
MAD and MSE performance improvement. In fact, our model’s MSE performance
relative to the benchmarks does not change substantially. This is an especially strong
result given that only 35% of the returns in a given month come from the previous
months’ sales (Table 3.3). Furthermore, the Partial II and Full specifications perform
significantly better than the Partial I specification. Therefore, we conclude that,
by exploiting the transaction-level data, our econometric model shows encouraging
performance improvements over the existing approaches. Retailers as well as their
upstream OEMs who conduct operational planning on a weekly or a monthly basis
may achieve considerable forecasting accuracy gains using our proposed method.
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Surprisingly, performance of the parsimonious Partial II model is only marginally
lower than that of the Full model. For all 15 comparisons, using a succinct set of
variables (category and month dummies) is not substantially inferior to using the
complete variable set. Furthermore, the homogeneity between Partial II and Full
is robust to both MAD and MSE measures. This result is encouraging for retailers
who only track minimal consumer behavior data, as the product and time data required for the Partial model can be collected from any modern Point-of-Sale (POS)
system. Thus, the Partial II model essentially offers considerable advantage over the
benchmarks with no additional data collection cost beyond a current POS system
(i.e. no need for a customer loyalty program). From a methodological perspective,
the performance proximity of Partial II and Full models also demonstrates that our
transaction-level modeling approach, not the specific choice of variables, contributes
the most to forecasting accuracy.
Among the benchmarks, the ARIMAX model appears to have the best overall
performance followed by the lagged sales model8 . While the lagged sales model has
performance nearly identical to the ARIMAX model in the one week case, the latter’s
advantage becomes more obvious as the time horizon increases. Recall that both
models exploit the correlation between past sales and current returns. Therefore, if
only period-level sales and return data are available (e.g. for an OEM who does not
have access to the retailer’s POS data), regressing returns on past sales is still the
best choice. This observation complements Toktay et al. (2000) in suggesting that a
lagged sales model or an ARIMAX model is the appropriate method for predicting not
only end-of-use returns but also consumer returns, provided that no transaction-level
data is available.

8

The baseline model is excluded from this comparison between benchmarks, since it uses actual
sales data instead of a forecast, which offers unfair advantage.
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Table 3.6 Estimation Results
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Variables
Month Dummies
November
December
Category Dummies
Imaging
Majors
Computer
Television
Digital Video System
Popularity
Maturity
Variety
(Maturity)2
(Variety)2
Other_purchases
Past_purchase
Past_visit
Past_return
Avg_price
Purchase_price
Constant
Druation Dependence ζ
Error Correlation θ

Naive Model (N = 2010)
Full Model (N = 20047)
Duration: Scale ln(λi )
Duration: Scale ln(λi )
Selection: Mean µi
Selection: Sigma ln(σi )
Estimate
Robust SE
Estimate Robust SE Estimate Robust SE Estimate Robust SE
Base is January. February - October are omitted for succinct exposition.
∗∗
0.417
(0.129)
0.426∗∗∗
(0.124)
0.0645
(0.0614)
0.299∗∗
(0.106)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
0.450
(0.101)
0.464
(0.0933)
0.0917
(0.0585)
0.397∗∗∗
(0.0762)
Base is audio speaker systems.
-0.0620
(0.150)
-0.0435
(0.137)
-0.554∗∗∗
(0.121)
-1.252∗∗
(0.444)
-0.544∗
(0.261)
-0.426
(0.270)
0.507
(1.081)
0.0616
(0.794)
-0.307∗
(0.152)
-0.286∗
(0.134)
0.0291
(0.284)
-0.269
(0.346)
-0.204
(0.136)
-0.160
(0.122)
-0.457∗∗∗
(0.139)
-1.112∗∗
(0.345)
0.163
(0.139)
0.147
(0.125)
0.146
(0.343)
0.165
(0.358)
+
+
0.0176
(0.00918)
0.0175
(0.00936)
-0.000218
(0.00179)
-0.00810
(0.00600)
-0.00822
(0.00564)
-0.00463
(0.00394)
-0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00850)
∗
∗
∗
∗∗∗
-0.00994
(0.00413)
-0.00836
(0.00394)
-0.0131
(0.00561)
-0.0372
(0.00771)
0.00000703 (0.000162) 0.000952∗ (0.000376)
0.000289∗ (0.000125) 0.000669∗∗∗ (0.000144)
-0.128∗∗
(0.0448)
0.0298
(0.0207)
0.0150∗
(0.00712)
-0.0245∗
(0.0108)
+
0.0589
(0.0340)
0.117
(0.0771)
2.526∗∗∗
(0.156)
3.020∗∗∗
(0.140)
0.932∗∗∗
(0.0728)
0.839∗∗∗
(0.0149)
0.906∗∗∗
(0.0147)
∗∗∗
0.855
(0.0245)

+p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***<0.001. Robust standard errors assume transactions clustered within products.

3.6

Managerial Implications

Through improving the accuracy of returns forecasting, retailers can better align their
strategic and tactical responses with the increasing volume of consumer returns by
better matching supply with demand. In addition to this "passive" approach, some
retailers also "actively" search for ways to influence returns (Toktay et al., 2003), which
include investing in buyer assistance programs and adjusting the return time window.
In the following, we use our econometric model to derive managerial implications for
these more proactive approaches. We also discuss the implications of our empirical
findings to previous consumer returns studies.
The richness of our data affords us to construct an extensive list of independent
variables. While some of these, such as M aturityi , V arietyi , and P ast_returni ,
are theoretically interesting, others are more related to the operations of the retailer
and therefore can suggest new insights for retail managers. Since one central feature
of our model is sample selection, we compare the model with sample selection (full
model) to the one without (naïve model9 ), with both models fitted to data excluding
the last 126 days to avoid the right truncation issue. The naïve model is estimated
using Stata’s “streg” routine. Furthermore, due to the transaction-within-product
structure of our data, we present the cluster robust standard errors for all parameter
estimates. Results are presented in Table 3.6.

Return Time Window
When determining the appropriate return time window, a retailer considers numerous
factors including returns processing, value depreciation, and the time window’s impact
on demand. A very lenient policy, such as the one represented in our data, does not
9

The naïve model assumes consumers who return their purchases take the same amount of
time to evaluate products as those who do not return. Therefore, it estimates only the return lag
regression and generalizes to the whole sample.
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put any constraint on trial duration and thus, ceteris paribus, it should attract the
highest demand. On the other hand, this leniency might also induce more frequent
returns and/or returns that have lost a significant portion of their value (especially
true for consumer electronics) by the time a product is eventually returned. While
our goal in this study is not to derive an optimal return window, which would require
assumptions regarding the retailer’s trade-offs as well as how consumers react to
different time windows, we do provide some potentially valuable insights into this
complex managerial decision. For example, our results provide guidance on whether
a given time window is likely to affect consumers’ trial experience – i.e., whether the
time window is too short to allow the consumer to fully assess the product’s fit or
too long such that the window can be shortened with minimal impact on consumer
demand. As an example, we consider a time window, η, that corresponds to the
95th percentile of experience duration for a typical consumer10 . That is, Pr(y <
ζ
−( η )b

b = 1−e
η|λ, ζ)

λ

1

= 0.95. Solving for η, we have η = λ(ln 20) bζ . Because experience

duration has been postulated to differ significantly across product categories and in
the holiday season, we estimate η for each category-season combination. Results are
presented in Table 3.7. We acknowledge that, in practice, an easily communicated
return policy (e.g. a uniform 90-day window) has the advantage of being easy to
understand. However, our results suggest that the mild customizations demonstrated
in Table 3.7 could help retailers better manage the trade-offs when setting return
time windows.

Return Probability
In Section 3.4, we provided reasons why product maturity, variety, and the buyer’s
past return experience might affect her current return decision. Table 3.6 shows
10

The typical consumer has all covariates equal to their sample averages. This approach is
sometimes called evaluating margin at means.
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Table 3.7 Time Windows Equivalent to 95th Percentile of
Experience Duration
Category
Audio Speaker
Imaging Equipment
Major Appliance
Computer
Television
Digital Video System

Non-holiday (days)
60.95
59.25
38.62
46.17
53.03
72.47

Holiday (days)
93.41
90.81
59.19
70.76
81.26
111.06

Non-holiday: Jan. through Oct.; Holiday: Nov. and Dec.

statistical significance of these effects based on the Wald test, which is consistent under the more formal likelihood ratio test. To provide more specific insights, we also
estimate the marginal effects of M aturityi , V arietyi , and P ast_returni on return
probability (this estimation is needed since their coefficients do not have the same
interpretation as in a linear regression model). Consider product maturity for illustrating the estimation procedure. Assume we want to know the amount of decrease
in return probability after a new product has been on the shelf for six months. For
transaction i, Pr(di < 0|M aturityi = 0) − Pr(di < 0|M aturityi = 6) is the quantity
of interest. However, this quantity is heterogeneous across the sample. Thus, we
compute an average as follows,
∆M aturity =

N
N
1 X
µb i
µb i
1 X
Φ(− |M aturityi = 0) −
Φ(− |M aturityi = 6)
σbi
σbi
N i=1
N i=1

where ∆M aturity is the Average Marginal Effect (AME) of product maturity. Point
estimates and standard errors of return probability evaluated at M aturityi = 0 and
M aturityi = 6 along with ∆M aturity are shown in Table 3.8 under the column headings
of estimate, S.E., and AME, respectively. We note that the specific values of maturity
(i.e. 0, 6, and 12) are arbitrarily chosen to facilitate interpretations. The AMEs of
V arietyi and P ast_returni are also provided in Table 3.811 . These results are used
11

Examining the cumulative distribution of V arietyi , we see that it reaches the first quartile
at around 5, second at around 15, and the third at around 25. Thus, we use 5, 15 and 25 as
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together with the coefficients in Table 3.6 to draw the managerial insights discussed
next.
Table 3.8 Average Marginal Effects
Return Probability
Estimate S.E.
AME
Maturity
New
6 months
12 months
Variety
5
15
25
Past_return
None
Once
Twice

0.114
0.092
0.085

0.004
0.003
0.004

-0.022(-19.41%)
-0.029(-25.36%)

0.124
0.102
0.088

0.005
0.002
0.004

-0.022(-17.70%)
-0.036(-29.32%)

0.093
0.103
0.113

0.002
0.002
0.003

0.010(10.21%)
0.020(21.60%)

Standard errors are derived using Delta method.

The negative sign of M aturityi and positive sign of (M aturityi )2 in the skedastic
function ln(σi ) (see Table 3.6) offer support for our argument that a consumer’s trial
uncertainty is convexly decreasing in product maturity. That is, while experience uncertainty will continue to drop throughout a product’s life cycle, the steepest decline
occurs in the first few periods. Furthermore, through its link with trial uncertainty,
maturity also negatively relates to return probability. This gives a quantitative idea of
how public information gradually replaces the role of hands-on experience in product
evaluation. This finding has interesting implications for recent work on processing
product returns. For example, in a recent study, Pince et al. (2013) examined how
an OEM should deploy returned items between warranty demand and refurbished
products. They find that the optimal strategy is sensitive to the return rate. Therefore, taking the maturity-return relationship into account, the OEM should adjust its
representative values. Regarding P ast_returni , 90% of the transactions are made by consumer
with twice or fewer return instances in the past. As a result, we use 0, 1, and 2 as representative
values.

48

allocation strategy as the focal product ages. In another recent paper, Ketzenberg
and Zuidwijk (2009) incorporated product returns into existing inventory models assuming a constant return rate over time. Our results suggest that the incorporation
of a decreasing return rate would be an interesting extension of this work.
Remark 3.1. Product maturity has a negative relationship with both consumer’s trial
uncertainty and return probability.
Regarding product variety12 , we observe a similar convexly decreasing relationship
with trial uncertainty – a negative sign for V arietyi and a positive sign for (V arietyi )2
in ln(σi ) (see Table 6). In the multi-product retail return models of Shulman et al.
(2009, 2011), consumers are assumed to be more certain about their product evaluation when more alternatives exist. The above result offers empirical support for
this modeling assumption. Interestingly, our analysis also shows that more variety
leads to lower return rates – for example, a product with 25 competing alternatives
is 29.32% less likely to be returned than one with only 5 alternatives. This indicates
another potential benefit of more product variety that should be included in product
assortment decisions.
Remark 3.2. Product variety has a negative relationship with both consumer’s trial
uncertainty and return probability.
Next, we use the above two remarks to derive managerial insights for "buyer assistance" programs. In practice, retailers can implement buyer assistance programs to
help consumers resolve their uncertainties about products as much as possible before
making a purchase (Douthit et al., 2011). For example, sales personnel might spend
extra time with consumers and listen to their needs thoroughly before recommending
a product (Ferguson et al., 2006). In addition, more samples may be displayed on the
12

Our data does not contain any truly innovative product categories, such as tablet computers.
Therefore, we do not expect product variety and maturity to be correlated, which is also supported
by the −0.006 Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables.
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floor and the full array of similar products might be arranged more effectively on the
shelf (Ofek et al., 2011). The hope in offering these programs is that the cost of these
programs will be offset by a drop in return rates (as well as perhaps an increase in
sales and customer sanctification). Our empirical findings suggest that these buyer
assistance investments provide larger benefits to newer products as well as categories
that offer fewer similar choices.13
Finally, our AME analysis suggests that a consumer’s past return experience exerts
a strong impact on future return tendency. Switching from zero past returns to
only one past return increases the probability of a future return by 10.2%, from
0.093 to 0.103, and further increases in return instances lead to additional increases
in the return probability. While returns are commonly regarded as a cost center,
retailers have also been advised to not overlook their positive link to long-term profits.
Both Griffis et al. (2012) and Petersen and Kumar (2009) show a positive correlation
between past return behavior and future purchases. We suggest that the impact
of consumers’ return experience on retailer profits might be less straightforward –
return-experienced consumers might make more purchases, but they also tend to
negate a higher proportion of those revenues by returning more.
Remark 3.3. A consumer’s past return instances is positively related to her future
return probability.

3.7

Conclusion

In this study we have developed an econometric model that enables retailers to leverage transaction-level data to forecast consumer returns by simultaneously predicting
whether and when a purchased item will be returned. When tested on a holdout sample of returns data from a large consumer electronics retailer, our approach generates
13
We remark that this finding should be treated with some caution, since our data did not
include information on the current focus of any buyer assistance programs at the retailer, and thus
endogeneity issues cannot be ruled out.
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on average 20% to 40% lower forecast error than a benchmark set of time-series methods that only use data currently available to the OEMs. Improved forecast accuracy
is very important to OEMs who operate refurbishing facilities because it allows them
to better match supply with demand for parts inventory and staffing decisions. In
addition to this practical contribution of a superior forecasting algorithm, our model
is also useful for the research community. Since many models of retail returns processing use return forecasts as a key input, our substantial improvement in accuracy
over benchmark methods makes our model an important contribution to the retail
operations literature.
Interpreting the estimation results of our econometric model allows us to also
provide guidance for retailers regarding how to: 1) target buyer assistance programs
to items with the highest unresolved consumer uncertainty, and 2) set return time
windows that are sufficient to capture the experience duration of most consumers
without being overly lenient. Finally, we provide empirical support for the hypotheses
that product maturity, variety, and previous return history all have a significant
impact on return probability.
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Chapter 4
Estimating the Value of a
Money-Back-Guarantee Policy in On-line
Retailing
4.1

Introduction and Literature

Money-Back-Guarantee (MBG) return policies are common for retailers of experience
goods, such as consumer electronics and fashion apparel, that require some “handson experience” by consumers to fully evaluate whether an item will fit their needs.
Given the ubiquity of MBG policies, managing consumer returns in recent years has
emerged as one of the most challenging issues for retailers. The National Retail
Federation (2011a) reports that the average consumer return rate in the retail sector
is 8.5% while for consumer electronics this figure is between 10% and 20%, with
returns processing costs running as high as 3% of revenues (Douthit et al., 2011).
While these returns are costly, consumers value the opportunity to return an item
that does not fit their needs.

Thus, the basic trade-off for a retailer is between

the benefit of consumers’ increased product valuation from the MBG and the cost of
processing returns1 . While much is known regarding the costs of returns, the benefits
are more difficult to quantify, and the academic research is largely silent on this point.
In this study, we address this research gap by empirically measuring the additional
1

While some OEMs may provide full refunds to retailers for consumer returns, the extent of
the refund is typically negotiated for each OEM and, regardless of the refund amount, the retailer
always incurs some of the processing costs. There are several recent examples of retailers having to
tighten their return policies because of escalating costs. See for example Grind (2013).
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price that on-line customers are willing to pay for a product with an MBG versus an
identical product without an MBG. Thus, we provide insights into the value of an
MBG in an on-line context.
On-line channels exhibit some unique characteristics that may lead to return policies being viewed differently than at traditional stores. First, consider shipping fees.
To be equivalent to a true MBG policy at a traditional store, an on-line store should
offer free forward shipping, free return shipping, and a refund of the entire product
price. An examination of the MBG policies of major retailers’ on-line stores and
manufacturers’ direct channels, however, reveals that return shipping is often the responsibility of consumers2 and any positive forward shipping charge is not refunded
upon return (see Table 4.1). Since a return shipping charge is paid for by the consumer rather than being set by the retailer, it is less interesting from a managerial
perspective and can be viewed as an exogenous cost of returning an item that is
relatively constant across all consumers. Non-refundable forward shipping charges,
however, vary widely across sellers and products, and are relatively easy for a retailer
to adjust3 . This leads to interesting research questions such as whether consumers
perceive forward shipping as a “latent restocking fee” and how this affects their value
of an MBG policy. Thus, we do not consider the heterogeneity in return shipping
cost, but instead focus on the effect of forward shipping cost on the value of an MBG.
A second uniqueness of on-line retailing is the lack of a physical interaction, which
makes it difficult for consumers to observe how a seller fulfills the MBG promise. In
such a context, consumers often rely on the feedback of other customers (e.g. reviews
of a seller) as a proxy for the service orientation of the seller. It follows that such
2

For apparel products, return shipping is sometimes covered by the retailer. Zappos and Urban
Outfitters are two well-known examples. Furthermore, if consumers receive a wrong item, return
shipping is typically covered by the retailer.
3

The actual forward shipping charge incurred by a retailer is primarily driven by its agreement
with the shipping carrier. However, the shipping fee it charges to the consumers is at its own
discretion.
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reputational information may impact the value of an MBG, but the magnitude of
this impact is not well-understood.
Table 4.1 Money-Back-Guarantee Policies of On-line Consumer Electronics
Retailers
Refund for
Refund for forward
Who pays for
Company
product price
shipping (if not free)
return shipping
Panel A1 : online stores of major retailers
Wal-Mart
full refund
no refund
consumer
Target
full refund
no refund
retailer
Amazon2
full refund
no refund
consumer
Best Buy
full refund
not clear
consumer
3
Sears
maybe 85%
no refund
consumer
Panel B: direct channel of representative manufacturers
Dell
maybe 85%3
no refund
consumer
HP
full refund
no refund
consumer
Sony
maybe 85%3
no refund
consumer
Lenovo
85%
no refund
consumer
Shure
full refund
no refund
consumer
Panel C: our data source
4
eBay
mostly full refund
no refund
mostly consumer
1

We include the top five consumer electronic retailers on the "2013 Top 100 Retailer" chart

published by National Retail Federation. Since Amazon is on the chart, it is included
although it does not have a brick-and-mortar store.
2

Most of the Amazon marketplace sellers use the same return policy as Amazon.

3

The retailer in general offers full refund on product price. However, it might charge up

to 15% depending on the condition of the returned item.
4

In principle, sellers on eBay could specify their own MBG terms. Our observation is

that most sellers fully refund the product price but do not refund shipping charges.

In addition to the practical need of retailers to quantify the benefit of MBGs,
there is also a theoretical interest in deriving the optimal MBG policies under different market and product conditions. Analytical studies of consumer returns such
as Akçay et al. (2013), McWilliams (2012), Shulman et al. (2009, 2010, 2011) and
Su (2009) assume that consumers are willing to pay more for a product if it comes
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with an MBG policy. Our study complements this research stream by providing an
approach to estimate this increment in consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP). To our
knowledge, the only existing study that empirically estimates the value of an MBG
policy is Anderson et al. (2009), who examine a mail-order catalog retailer of apparel
products. Our study provides three new contributions to this literature. First, we
explore the on-line retailing context, including the unique roles of forward shipping
and seller reputation in determining the value of MBGs. Second, both our approach
to the estimation problem and the type of data analyzed are quite distinct from Anderson et al. (2009), because our focus is on consumer electronics while theirs was on
apparel products. The fact that identical consumer electronic products are frequently
sold by a variety of retailers facilitates our third contribution. That is, we actually
observe purchases from retailers with and without MBG policies rather than using a
counterfactual analysis as in Anderson et al. (2009).
In practice, the value of an MBG policy is hard to quantify because most retailers
are consistently lenient in accepting returns and hence one does not directly observe
the consequences of a no-MBG policy. Anderson et al. (2009) tackle the estimation
problem by fitting a structural model to a catalog retailer’s panel data, such that
while all consumers in the data set made purchase and return decisions in the presence of an MBG policy, their potential response to the absence of an MBG policy
is approximated by a counterfactual analysis. We introduce an alternative approach
for the estimation problem by exploiting some of the uniqueness of the transactions
on eBay.4 The advantage of the eBay platform is that multiple sellers offer identical
products, some with an MBG and some without. Furthermore, for those having an
4

The approaches presented in Anderson et al. (2009) and the current study are suitable for
different products, depending on the retailer’s current assortment. For example, if a product has
been carried by a retailer for some time, Anderson et al. (2009) has the advantage of estimating the
value of MBG from the retailer’s own data. Our approach, in contrast, can be used for any product,
provided that it is widely offered on eBay. In situations where both approaches are applicable, one
could be used to corroborate the findings from the other.
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MBG policy, forward shipping charges vary widely, from free to as high as 50% of the
total price paid. Therefore, our data collected from eBay captures large variations
in both the existence and the leniency of a retailer’s MBG policy, which lays the
foundation for identifying the value of an MBG and uncovering how forward shipping fees affect this value. In addition, the heterogeneous reputation of eBay sellers
also allows us to study the relationship between e-reputation and MBG value. Our
approach enables us to explore whether the on-line reputation of a retailer is used by
consumers to infer the smoothness of its return handling process and hence influence
the value of its MBG policy. One key econometric challenge in our study involves
accounting for a seller’s endogenous choice of whether or not to offer an MBG policy.
Intuitively, the sellers who are more likely to offer MBGs should also be the ones
who expect to yield a better payoff from doing so. In Section 5 we discuss why the
commonly used instrumental variable approach fails to correct for this endogeneity
and propose the use of a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator.
We show that failure to account for this endogeneity issue results in an estimate of
average MBG value that is substantially higher (36%) than our FIML estimates.
Based on 2946 eBay transactions of 86 products, our empirical analysis reveals
several interesting results. First, ignoring the endogeneity of the MBG policy choice,
we estimate that a seller with free forward shipping and an average reputation could
expect a 7.01% increase in a consumer’s WTP for the product if it switches from
no-MBG to MBG. However, this increment is reduced to 5.16% once endogeneity is
accounted for. Second, the value of an MBG policy for on-line consumer electronics
is, in general, between 1% and 7% of the product value. Third, shipping charges tend
to rapidly erode the value of an MBG policy. For example, we find that if 20% or
more of the total price paid for a product is attributed to shipping, then the value
of an MBG is statistically indifferent from zero. Fourth, we show that positive and
negative seller reputations have separate and opposing effects on the value of an MBG
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policy and that the sellers with the largest number of reviews are not necessarily the
firms that benefit the most from offering MBGs. Lastly, we show how our estimation
results can be used to construct an optimization model that maximizes a retailer’s
expected per-unit profit by varying the forward shipping charge.

4.2

Decomposing the Value of an MBG policy

A consumers’ WTP for a product is typically expressed as an aggregate monetary
value. Given that our goal is to estimate the value of an MBG, it is useful to first discuss the individual components of WTP. When evaluating a product, consumers take
both its physical and service attributes into account, which together define the product’s total value. Following the hedonic pricing literature, the contribution of each
attribute in forming this aggregate value is additively separable (Rosen, 1974). In
other words, if we take away a service attribute, such as the MBG policy, consumer’s
WTP for the product decreases by a quantity that is equal to the value of the MBG.
This additive separability idea has been applied in a variety of areas to understand
consumers’ valuation of warranty service (Chu and Chintagunta, 2009), remanufactured products (Subramanian and Subramanyam, 2012), brand names (Randall et al.,
1998), and arts (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2013). In the area of consumer returns,
although it is reported that over 70% of consumers actively evaluate a retailer’s MBG
policy before purchase (Hsiao and Chen, 2012), guidance on how to estimate the value
of MBGs is very limited.
Let V1 denote the total value of a product with an MBG and V0 denote the
value of the exact same product without an MBG. Given the additive separability
assumption, V1 − V0 corresponds to the value of an MBG, denoted by V . If we have
data on both V1 and V0 , estimating V should be achievable through an appropriate
empirical framework. We show in Section 4.3 that such data can be collected from
eBay and, in Section 4.4, that this empirical framework should account for a seller’s
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endogenous decision of whether to offer an MBG. Note that V captures the impact
of an MBG on product valuation, not on demand directly. Next, we hypothesize why
V is contingent on both the forward shipping fee and the seller’s reputation in an
on-line retail context. While confirming the statistical significance of a hypothesis is
important, our main focus is on the quantification of the effect sizes, which form the
basis of our theoretical and managerial implications.

The Effect of Forward Shipping Charge
We begin by considering the case where no MBG is offered with a product, which is
the focus of previous shipping fee studies. We observe that both analytical (e.g. Leng
and Becerril-Arreola, 2010) and empirical (e.g. Lewis, 2006) works on shipping fees
often construct a consumer’s utility function as the difference between an exogenously
determined product valuation and the total price paid. Therefore, the shipping fee
alters a consumer’s net utility from purchasing a product through the total price paid
for that product, but does nothing to her V0 . That is, controlling for shipping service
type (e.g. standard versus expedited) and observable seller characteristics, a higher
shipping charge does not alter a consumer’s valuation for the product, V0 . This is
because the shipping charge itself does not carry any implication for the physical
and service attributes of the product that a consumer uses to calculate her V0 . A
testable empirical implication of the above discussion is that the shipping charge is
not a significant predictor for the total monetary amount a consumer is willing to
pay for a product (conditional on seller and transactional attributes). In Section 4.5,
we show that our analysis supports this argument, providing consistency between our
data and existing theories.
Next, we consider the case when an MBG is offered. Now, consumers have the
opportunity to return their purchased items after experiencing them. When a return
is deemed necessary, a consumer typically receives a refund for the total price paid
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minus the forward shipping charge. For example, if a digital camera is purchased for
$300 with a $50 forward shipping charge, the refundable amount is $300, not $350.
As discussed in the Introduction, this is a common practice for the online retailers
of consumer electronics, including the sellers on eBay5 . Given that most buyers of
consumer electronics (a prototypical category of experience goods and our focus in this
study) have a non-trivial probability of returning the purchased item, the calculation
of product valuation V1 needs to include the non-refundable shipping charge. The
higher the shipping charge, the more loss a consumer will potentially incur, which in
turn reduces V1 . Put differently, the forward shipping charge should be considered
by a rational consumer as an “implicit restocking fee.” To summarize, while an MBG
policy grants consumers the opportunity to return a disliked item and should thus
have a positive value (V > 0), the size of this value is likely to diminish with the
amount of the forward shipping charge, as expressed by the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The forward shipping charge has a negative impact on the value of
an MBG for a product.
Note that a higher shipping charge may also has a positive effect (from the retailer’s perspective) of reducing the likelihood of a product being returned (since less
of the total price paid is refunded to the consumer). In other words, a higher shipping
charge simultaneously reduces the WTP for a product (bad for the seller) and reduces
the probability of a return in the case of a misfit (good for the seller). We show how
our estimation results may be used to optimize this trade-off in Section 4.5.
5

The only instance in which an eBay seller is held responsible for refunding the forward shipping
is when a consumer receives an item not matching the description on the product listing page. In
this case, the buyer can file a claim with eBay and the seller is obligated to refund both the base
product price and the forward shipping charge.
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The Effect of Seller Reputation
Sellers on e-marketplaces such as Amazon, eBay, and Rakuten often have very similar store designs that are based on the templates provided by their retail platforms.
In addition, product listing pages are usually standardized – the only customizable
section is the product description area, where sellers can add text and pictures6 .
Nevertheless, consumers’ WTP for identical products sold in such homogeneous environments exhibit significant variation (Standifird, 2001). The previous literature
suggests that the seller reputation indices posted by the marketplaces provide consumers with an effective differentiator between various sellers’ service qualities (e.g.
Houser and Wooders (2006) and Resnick et al. (2006)). For example, eBay publishes
the number of reviews (positive, neutral, and negative) a seller receives in a past period of time (three, six, and twelve months). These measures are used by consumers
to infer a seller’s speed of order processing, carefulness of packaging, friendliness of
communication, and other service competencies. In addition, previous research (e.g.
Dimoka et al. (2012), Obloj and Capron (2011), and Standifird (2001)) also demonstrates that positive and negative feedback for a seller have separate effects. In the
context of eBay, this implies that more positive seller reviews increase consumers’
WTP, while more negative or neutral reviews7 decrease it. We show in Section 4.5
that our data supports this argument.
Using our notation, the existing theories offer explanations for why V1 and V0
would change with a seller’s reputation indices. However, they do not provide insights
or evidence into the relationship between reputation and the value of offering an MBG,
V . The effect of the shipping charge on V focuses on the objective aspect of an MBG
6

EBay offers the option to sellers of paying extra for a premium display, which is called eBay
store. We control for a seller’s participation in eBay store in our model.
7
We are consistent with previous literature in grouping neutral and negative reviews together
to represent the negative reputation of a seller (see Dimoka et al. (2012), Obloj and Capron (2011),
and Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012)).
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– the amount of money a seller promises to refund upon return. For consumers to
enjoy the benefits of an MBG, the fulfillment of this promise is as important as the
promise itself.
In practice, sellers have a fair degree of freedom in executing the return and refund
process. First, a seller may attempt to deny the returns that are purely due to buyer
remorse. Second, if original packaging cannot be fully recovered or item labels are
removed, a seller may be less willing to process the returns. Third, a seller may be
very slow in actually issuing a refund.8 Such actions can create a considerable level
of return hassle for the consumer. We expect that consumers will use the reputation
indices to infer how a seller will exercise its return processing freedom. If a consumer
believes that a seller will process returns more smoothly than a competing seller, her
valuation of this seller’s MBG should be higher. Thus, we propose opposing effects
of positive and negative seller reputation as follows.
Hypothesis

2a. The value of an online seller’s MBG policy increases with its

positive reputation.
Hypothesis

2b. The value of an online seller’s MBG policy decreases with its

negative reputation.
In addition to our theoretical contribution to the e-reputation literature, the above
hypotheses also offer practical implications to eBay sellers. Based on the distribution
of reputation indices, we can first segment these sellers into groups and then estimate
the group-specific values for V . Depending on the relative effect sizes of the positive
and negative reputation, sellers with more reviews might not enjoy a higher MBG
value. This analysis is presented in Section 4.5.
8

The eBay community forum (accessible from community.ebay.com) shows buyer complaints
regarding all these aspects of the return handling process.
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4.3

Data and Variables

To estimate the value of an MBG policy and test our hypotheses, we collect transactional data from eBay auctions of consumer electronic products. We believe that eBay
is an ideal data source for our study for three reasons. First, for identical products,
we are able to observe transactions both with and without an MBG policy, which is a
result of the fact that some sellers on eBay offer MBGs while others do not. Second,
most eBay sellers impose a flat rate shipping fee (location independent). Therefore,
we can observe the actual shipping cost paid by the buyer, which varies across sellers. Third, sellers on eBay can list a product either in the bidding format or in the
fixed-price format. We only use the former, which resembles a second-price English
auction, and final prices paid in these bidding transactions have been extensively used
to measure consumers’ valuation of a product (Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004), Houser
and Wooders (2006), Obloj and Capron (2011), Resnick et al. (2006) and Standifird
(2001)).
Our focus on consumer electronics has some practical advantages. eBay sellers’
MBG policies for these products match very closely with the three characteristics of
a typical MBG policy in on-line retailing – while product price is refunded, forward
and return shipping charges are not. In addition, many electronic products have a
reasonable transaction frequency on eBay, which increases the chance of observing
both MBG and no-MBG transactions. Finally, as compared with other product
categories such as apparel, there are few private labels in consumer electronics, which
allows for comparisons between retailers selling the exact same products.
To construct our sample, we followed a two-step data collection procedure – product selection and transaction collection. For product selection, we started with eBay’s
existing categorization scheme for consumer electronics9 . The categories with low
9

Accessible at www.ebay.com/electronics.
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transaction frequency, such as digital clocks and electronic kettles, were filtered out
to avoid data sparsity. We also excluded products that have complicated configurations such as laptops and desktops to avoid matching issues10 . This high-level
screening process resulted in 16 categories of consumer electronic products (see Table
4.2). For each category, we then used eBay’s product search engine to list the top 100
products by popularity and randomly selected 10 products from this list. This product selection approach allows us to mitigate the risk of constructing a biased sample
and ensures a reasonable degree of transaction frequency. Our product selection process generated 16 × 10 = 160 products. Next, we collected bidding transactions for
these products. Based on their conditions, items on eBay are categorized by new,
new other (mostly open box items), refurbished, used, and for-parts. We collected
completed bidding transactions only of new items during the first quarter of 2013
regarding these 160 products.
The following steps were used to clean the data to make it applicable for our
analysis. First, we excluded the transactions that have a location-dependent shipping charge, since the exact shipping fee paid by the buyer is not visible to us for
these transactions. Second, we eliminated the transactions that have a "buy it now"
option, since the format of these transactions is a mixture of fixed-price and auction.
Third, the small fraction of transactions that have an explicit restocking fee were
excluded. Fourth, free return shipping transactions (also a very small fraction) were
also excluded. Fifth, to best estimate V , we required products to have transactions
both with and without an MBG. Thus, we excluded the products that only have one
type of transactions. Lastly, we removed a small number of potential outliers, which
is discussed in the next section. The screened sample contains 2,946 transactions of
86 products.
10

For example, virtually all laptop models can be further divided based on hard disk, processor,
and RAM, which makes matching the exact same model difficult.
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Dependent Variables
For each transaction i, we define the consumer’s valuation of the product, vi , as
the total price paid in an eBay auction. If there is a shipping charge, vi is the
sum of the base product price and the shipping charge. As discussed earlier, this
operationalization of product valuation or WTP is widely used in the literature. We
denote the MBG transactions by Ii = 1. The typical eBay terminology for an MBG
policy is "returns accepted, X days money back, and buyer pays return shipping". The
default "X" value when a seller lists a product is 14, although it could be changed to 7,
30 and 60. The no-MBG transactions are denoted by Ii = 0. If there is no MBG, the
eBay terminology is simply "no returns accepted". In our sample, the proportions of
no returns, and 7, 14, and 30 days money back are 76.04%, 0.1%, 23.52%, and 0.34%,
respectively. No 60-day MBG policies were observed. Since the vast majority of the
MBG transactions has a 14-day return period (the default), we do not study the
impact of return period. However, we perform a robustness check on our estimation
results by removing the 7 and 30 days MBG transactions (Section 4.5).
Table 4.2 Difference in Consumer Valuation Between MBG and No-MBG
Transactions
Product category
Audio System
Calculator
Camcorder
Camera
Camera Lens
Vacuum Cleaner
DVD Player
GPS

Avg. differential ($)
4.08
8.18
12.07
10.84
10.88
16.20
2.48
10.41

Product category
Headphone
Keyboard
Modem
MP3 Player
Printer
Scanner
Tablet
Webcam

Avg. differential ($)
6.36
4.65
2.89
6.99
5.04
5.58
21.31
2.83

In Table 4.2, we report the impact of an MBG policy on product valuation in
its simplest form – the difference in vi between MBG and no-MBG transactions.
Specifically, we calculate v|I=1 − v|I=0 for each specific product and average this
differential by category. This simple calculation suggests that MBG policies are valued
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positively by consumers in our data. It also suggests that the dollar value of an MBG
is likely to vary widely across products, probably due to their heterogeneous price
levels. This observation implies that in order to pool products together for analysis,
we should use a normalized version of vi as our dependent variable. For transaction
i of a certain product, we define the dependent variable as yi =

vi
v|I=0

× 100, where

v|I=0 is the average vi of no-MBG transactions for this product. That is, we scale the
transaction price by the average price of no-MBG transactions of the same product.
This normalization approach allows for a clean interpretation of the value of an MBG
policy – the percentage increase in consumer willingness-to-pay when a seller switches
from no-MBG to MBG, or

V
.
V0

For both MBG and no-MBG transactions, we remove

the highest and lowest 1% of yi to mitigate the noise from outliers.
As we will show in Section 4.4, the appropriate econometric framework involves
two dependent variables, yi and Ii . Since yi is our primary interest, we label it as the
outcome variable and hence its regression as the outcome equation. The additional
regression for Ii is used to control for a seller’s endogenous choice of whether to offer
an MBG. Therefore, we label Ii as the choice variable and its regression as the choice
equation.

Independent Variables
Forward shipping fee. The dollar value of the shipping fee is likely to vary across
products; therefore, we normalize the shipping charge using the same approach as in
the previous section to create shipping_charge i . Around 28% of the transactions in
our data provide free shipping. For those with a positive shipping charge, the mean
is 7.85% of the average total price for no-MBG transactions. Table 4.3 provides the
detailed summary statistics.
Seller reputation. We use literature-based reputation measures – slr_posi_log i
for positive seller reputation and slr_nega_log i for negative seller reputation (e.g.
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for the Shipping Fee
Variable

No MBG
MBG

Free shipping
Observations
600
222

Buyer pays shipping
Observations Mean
1640
7.82
484
7.98

Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012)). Specifically, slr_posi_log i (slr_nega_log i )
is the logged number of positive (neutral and negative) feedback received by the seller
in the past 12 months. We use a seller’s six-month review statistics as an alternative
measure for slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i in a robustness check, as described in
Section 4.5
Transaction-related controls. The previous literature suggests that the total price
paid in an online auction is related to its activeness, length, and ending time (Houser
and Wooders (2006), Resnick et al. (2006) and Standifird (2001)). For transaction i,
bids_log i measures the logged number of bids, duration i is the number of days the
auction lasts, weekend i is whether the auction ends during the weekend (Saturday
and Sunday) and night i is whether it ends at night (6 p.m. to 6 a.m.). duration i takes
values of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 days, which are eBay’s available duration choices. Since
our data collection period spans three months, we create two month dummies, february i and march i , to account for the rapid value depreciation of consumer electronics.
Furthermore, we use handling_time i to account for the transaction’s indicated order
processing time, which could be 1, 2 or 3 days. We control for the type of shipping service associated with each transaction. Our data contains economy (17.8%),
standard (45.2%), and expedited (36.0%) shipping services, which are coded by two
dummy variables shipping_standard i and shipping_expedited i .
Seller-related controls. An “eBay store” is a marketing tool sold by eBay to its
sellers for reaching a larger audience. Sellers operating a store may be more attractive
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and thus command a higher price premium from consumers. We use a dummy variable, slr_store i , to account for this effect. Similarly, the length of existence of a seller
could also confound the relationship between reputation and valuation (Subramanian
and Subramanyam, 2012). We use slr_tenure_log i to measure the logged number of
days from a seller’s registration date to the date transaction i is made.
Product-related controls. We use pdt_avg_price i to control for the price level of
a product, which is simply the average price paid for this product (in hundreds
of dollars) during our data collection period. Consistent with Subramanian and
Subramanyam (2012), we also account for the demand of a product. pdt_demand_log i
measures the logged number of new units sold of a product during our data collection
period. In addition, we use pdt_review_log i , the logged number of reviews received
by a product, to capture the extent of word-of-mouth information available (Dimoka
et al., 2012). Lastly, given that we have 16 product categories, we create 15 dummy
variables to account for any category-level fixed effects.
Table 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables discussed above, except
the categorical dummies. Note that when performing a logarithmic transformation
for a variable, we use new = log(old + 1) if the original variable has a zero minimum.

4.4

The Econometric Model

When a seller decides to list an item on eBay, she is presented with a choice of
whether or not to offer an MBG policy. It is reasonable to expect that sellers will
intentionally choose the option that is expected to make them better off. Therefore, if
we conceptualize the binary variable of MBG choice Ii as the “treatment assignment”
in econometric terms, we cannot consider the treatment assignment process random.
Instead, endogeneity in Ii will affect our empirical strategy if some unobserved factors
influencing Ii also affect the outcome variable yi . The more obvious consequence
for the correlation between Ii and the error term in yi is that simple estimators
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Variable
outcome DV yi
choice DV Ii
shipping_charge i
slr_posi_log i
slr_nega_log i
slr_store i
slr_tenure_log i
pdt_avg_price i
pdt_demand_log i
pdt_review_log i
bids_log i
duration i
shipping_standard i
shipping_expedited i
handling_time i
weekend i
night i
february i
march i

Mean
101.40
0.24
5.66
3.78
0.57
0.10
7.34
2.02
5.87
4.38
1.78
3.99
0.45
0.37
1.96
0.31
0.35
0.33
0.21

SD Min
5.98 83.89
0.43
0
6.36
0
1.82
0
0.95
0
0.30
0
1.34
0
1.45 0.11
1.16 1.39
1.92 0.69
1.29
0
2.56
1
0.50
0
0.48
0
0.76
1
0.46
0
0.48
0
0.47
0
0.41
0

Max
133.36
1
49.35
11.91
7.24
1
8.64
8.03
7.24
8.26
4.37
10
1
1
3
1
1
1
1

Categorical dummies are excluded to conserve space.

such as OLS will produce biased estimates. What may be less obvious is that the
instrumental variable (IV) approach, an often-used method for resolving endogeneity,
is also inappropriate in our context. In the following, we discuss these issues in detail
and construct a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator to eliminate
the endogeneity concern.
∗
denote the potential product valuation when an MBG
For transaction i, let y1i
∗
is offered and y0i
when it is not offered. We use the term "potential" because the
∗
valuations are latent variables. In the actual data, we do not observe y1i
for the
∗
Ii = 0 transactions or y0i
for the Ii = 1 transactions. However, it is important for us
∗
∗
to model the potential outcomes (y1i
and y0i
) as opposed to directly regressing the
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actuals (yi ) since our desired economic interpretation is embedded in the potentials.
That is, we want to estimate the change in consumer product valuation if a seller
switches from no-MBG to MBG (or from MBG to no-MBG). This change represents
the value of an MBG policy.
∗
∗
Specifically, y1i
and y0i
are modeled as two linear equations in their respective

explanatory variables:
∗
y0i
= α0 + α0 Xi + e0i

(4.1a)

∗
y1i
= β0 + β 0 Xi + e1i

(4.1b)

where α0 and β0 are intercepts, α0 and β 0 are vectors of coefficients, and the error
terms follow normal distributions such that e0i ∼ N (0, σ0 ) and e1i ∼ N (0, σ1 ). We
use different notations for the coefficient vectors in (4.1a) and (4.1b) since our key
interests reside in the difference between these two equations. Since we do not have
any variable that is observed only in part of the sample (i.e. when Ii = 0 or when
Ii = 1), the same set of explanatory variables are applied to both equations. The
above setup can be combined into a single equation, utilizing the MBG status dummy,
Ii .
yi∗ = α0 + δ0 Ii + α0 Xi + δ 0 Xi Ii + e0i (1 − Ii ) + e1i Ii

(4.2)

where δ0 = β0 − α0 and δ 0 = β 0 − α0 .
We first consider an OLS estimator for (4.2), which is obtained by directly regressing yi on Xi and Ii :
0

0

yi = α0ols + δ0ols Ii + α ols Xi + δ ols Xi Ii + εi

(4.3)

The problem with this approach is that Ii is likely to be correlated with e1i (a component in εi ) and hence correlated with εi as well. Consequently, the OLS estimates
will be biased.
By construction of the OLS estimator, the potential correlation between Ii and εi
should come from some common unobserved factors that affect both Ii and εi . We
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use a probit regression to separate the effects of observed and unobserved factors on
Ii :
Ii = 1(γ0 + γ 0 Zi + ui > 0)

(4.4)

0

where γ0 is the intercept, γ is the vector of coefficients, and the error term is normally
distributed such that ui ∼ N (0, 1). The standard deviation of ui is normalized to
1, a common identification requirement in choice models. Zi could contain different
variables than Xi . We believe that the common unobserved factors in ui and εi
might relate to the textual contents of a seller’s previous reviews. First, if a seller
has received reviews explicitly mentioning their meritorious returns handling process
in the past, consumers would be willing to pay more for their MBG policy. Factoring
in the higher gains from implementing an MBG policy, such sellers are more likely to
offer an MBG in the first place. Essentially, this implies a positive correlation between
ui and e1i . Second, even without specific reviews on returns, consumers might still
use reviews related to other types of customer service to infer a seller’s friendliness in
handling returns. Similarly, sellers who have received meritorious comments might be
more likely to offer MBGs and consumers might be willing to pay more for the MBGs
from these sellers. Again, this leads to a positive correlation between ui and e1i . Note
that sellers’ heterogeneous costs of processing returns should not be considered as a
driver for this correlation, since cost is visible to sellers but not to consumers. That
is, while the cost enters into ui , it is not included in e0i or e1i . Formally, we denote
the correlation between ui and e1i by ρ1 and that between ui and e0i by ρ0 . The above
discussion gives us strong a priori belief that ρ1 is positive, while the directionality
of ρ0 is not a priori clear. Since ui and e1i are parts of Ii and εi , respectively, the
correlation between the former will lead to correlation between the latter and thus
bias the OLS results.
Given that an IV approach, such as the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) procedure,
is a commonly used method to resolve the endogeneity issue, we consider its appro-
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priateness in our context. Suppose that qi is an instrument for Ii . In the first stage, Ii
is regressed on Zi and qi and Xi Ii is regressed on Zi and Xi qi . The linear predictions,
dI , are used subsequently in the second stage to replace I and X I . The
Ibi and X
i i
i
i i

following regression is then estimated through OLS.
0

0

dI + ε
yi = α02sls + δ02sls Ibi + α 2sls Xi + δ 2sls X
i i
i

(4.5)

As Heckman (1997) and Vella and Verbeek (1999) point out, this IV approach produces consistent estimates only when the unobserved factors in ui affects e0i and e1i in
the same way. Technically, this requires ρ1 = ρ0 (Vella and Verbeek, 1999, p.474) as
in Guajardo et al. (2012). This assumption is especially unappealing in our context,
since we have many reasons to believe ρ1 > 0 but the sign of ρ0 is not clear. This
subtle but important assumption of the IV approach has strong implications for the
choice of an appropriate estimator.11
Next, we derive the FIML estimator that will be used for our analysis. As an
intermediate step for constructing the likelihood function for the whole sample, we
separately derive the likelihood for an MBG transaction and a no-MBG transaction.
∗
= α0 + α0 Xi + e0i and γ0 + γ 0 Zi + ui < 0. Since e0i and ui
If Ii = 0, we have yi = y0i

follow a bivariate normal distribution, properties of the truncated normal distribution
are used to derive the likelihood for a no-MBG transaction, which is given by:
Li |Ii =0 = Pr(e0i = yi − α0 − α0 Xi , ui < −γ0 − γ 0 Zi )

(4.6)

1
φ(yi − α0 − α0 Xi ) Pr(ui < −γ0 − γ 0 Zi |e0i )
σ0
−γ0 − γ 0 Zi − σρ00 (yi − α0 − α0 Xi )
1
0
q
=
φ(yi − α0 − α Xi )Φ[
]
σ0
1 − ρ20

=

where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the PDF and CDF of a standard normal distribution. If
∗
Ii = 1, we have yi = y1i
= β0 + β 0 Xi + e1i and γ0 + γ 0 Zi + ui > 0. The likelihood for
11
To observe the severity of the bias in OLS and 2SLS estimators, we conduct a simulation study
to evaluate the finite sample properties of these approaches in Appendix G. We find that, with our
econometric setup: OLS is always biased; when ρ1 = ρ0 both 2SLS and FIML are unbiased but
FIML is more efficient; and when ρ1 6= ρ0 only FIML is unbiased.
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an MBG transaction is given by:
Li |Ii =1 = Pr(e1i = yi − β0 − β 0 Xi , ui > −γ0 − γ 0 Zi )

(4.7)

1
φ(yi − β0 − β 0 Xi ) Pr(ui > −γ0 − γ 0 Zi |e1i )
σ1
γ0 + γ 0 Zi + σρ11 (yi − β0 − β 0 Xi )
1
q
=
]
φ(yi − β0 − β 0 Xi )Φ[
σ1
1 − ρ21
=

Combining (4.6) and (4.7), the likelihood for any given transaction is Li = (1 − Ii ) ×
Li |Ii =0 + Ii × Li |Ii =1 . Therefore, the log likelihood for the whole sample is as follows:
LL =

n
X

[(1 − Ii ) ln Li |Ii =0 + Ii ln Li |Ii =1 ]

(4.8)

i=1

Maximizing (4.8) yields the FIML estimator of the α and β vectors, which is asymptotically consistent (Maddala, 1983). We use Stata’s “ml” language to program this
estimator (see Appendix G for details).
We can use our model to test for endogeneity in two ways. The more direct test
examines the statistical significance of ρ1 . Alternatively, we could also implement
the Hausman’s model specification test to compare the systematic difference between
the FIML and OLS estimates (Hausman, 1978). We perform both tests in the next
section.
∗
∗
With our setup, the difference between E(y1i
) and E(y0i
) entails the interpretation

of "the value of an MBG policy". That is,
∗
∗
N V = E(y1i
) − E(y0i
) = β0 + β 0 Xi − α0 − α0 Xi = δ0 + δ 0 Xi

(4.9)

We use N V since, strictly speaking, the quantity being estimated is a normalized
value: N V =

V
.
V0

Our three hypotheses are tested through the statistical significance

of the δ vector.
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Table 4.5 Estimation Results

Variables
indicator for MBG Ii
shipping_charge i
slr_posi_log i
slr_nega_log i
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constant
shipping_charge i
slr_posi_log i
slr_nega_log i
slr_store i
slr_tenure_log i
pdt_avg_price i
pdt_demand_log i
pdt_review_log i
bids_log i
duration i
shipping_standard i
shipping_expedited i
handling_time i
Log likelihood2

OLS Estimates
Without controls
With controls
Coeff.
S.E.
Coeff.
S.E.
δ coefficients
δ coefficients
7.509*** (0.596) 7.008*** (0.337)
-0.137* (0.063) -0.108** (0.041)
1.579*** (0.372) 1.112*** (0.216)
-2.483*** (0.606) -2.354*** (0.436)
α coefficients
α coefficients
98.22*** (1.404) 97.23*** (1.289)
0.0041 (0.018)
0.0042
(0.015)
0.944*** (0.107) 0.843*** (0.084)
-2.876*** (0.292) -3.242*** (0.215)
4.969*** (0.570)
0.395*** (0.067)
0.251** (0.084)
-0.202+ (0.120)
-0.162** (0.050)
0.232*** (0.064)
0.239*** (0.034)
0.116
(0.261)
0.673** (0.258)
-0.403** (0.145)
-10042.43

-9616.58

FIML Estimates
Outcome equation yi
Choice equation Ii
Coeff.
S.E.
Coeff.
S.E.
δ coefficients
5.163*
(2.051)
-0.124**
(0.041)
1.313***
(0.214)
-1.914*
(0.819)
α coefficients
γ coefficients
+
97.12***
(2.058)
0.635
(0.368)
0.0056
(0.019)
-0.0185+
(0.009)
0.830***
(0.085)
0.0474
(0.033)
-3.338*** (0.560)
0.524***
(0.066)
+
5.115***
(1.008)
0.633
(0.382)
0.376***
(0.069)
-0.0453
(0.029)
0.245*
(0.109) -0.110***
(0.026)
-0.183
(0.116)
-0.0526
(0.041)
-0.158*** (0.044)
0.00204
(0.013)
0.252***
(0.064)
0.0414
(0.027)
0.229***
(0.036)
0.0107
(0.015)
0.128
(0.260)
0.0257
(0.136)
0.666*
(0.273)
0.0872
(0.138)
-0.465*
(0.212) -0.258***
(0.052)
error correlations 1 : ρc0 = −0.076, ρc1 = 0.375∗
-9602.31

weekend i , night i , february i , and march i are included in OLS (with controls) and FIML models. categorical dummies is included in all models.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster-robust (product level) standard errors in parentheses.

4.5

Analysis and Results

We fit both the OLS estimator as in (4.3) and the FIML estimator as in (4.8) to the
eBay data12 . The OLS estimator is fitted both with and without control variables.
The endogeneity issue is addressed progressively through these three models. For the
outcome equation (yi ), we estimate both α and δ coefficients for shipping_charge i ,
slr_posi_log i , and slr_nega_log i . For all other covariates (the control variables),
we estimate only the α coefficients and constrain the δ coefficients to zero13 . We
also center slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i to give δ0 (the constant term in N V ) an
interpretation of the value of an MBG when forward shipping is free and reputation
indices are at the mean. Furthermore, we use cluster robust standard errors. Results
are reported in Table 4.5.
As discussed earlier, the main econometric issue involved in estimating the value
of an MBG is a seller’s endogenous choice to offer the MBG. This endogeneity implies that the sellers who expect a higher consumer WTP from offering MBGs are
also likely to be the ones who actually offer MBGs. Therefore, the consequence of
not accounting for endogeneity is an exaggerated value of the MBG policy. While
the OLS without controls model takes the contingency of the MBG value (V depends
on forward shipping and seller reputation) into account, it ignores the fact that the
decision to offer an MBG is endogenous. As a result, this model produces a misleadingly high estimate of V (δ0 = 7.509). The OLS with controls model partially
addresses the endogeneity issue through the inclusion of control variables. Specifically, some variables, such as slr_store i , exert a dual impact on both the seller’s
choice to offer an MBG and the consumer’s product valuation. Therefore, controlling
for these variables should attenuate the endogeneity problem, which is evident from
12

2SLS is not included in our empirical analysis because it is less appropriate than FIML in our
context. Furthermore, a solid instrument for MBG choice is not present in our data.
13
This is analogous to the conventional practice that only the hypothesized interaction effects are
estimated in a linear regression model.

74

the decrease in δ0 from 7.509 to 7.008. The OLS model, however, cannot account for
the unobserved factors that cause the endogneity problem. Through modeling the
correlation between the error terms of the outcome and choice equations (i.e., where
the unobserved factors enter), the FIML model does account for the influence of these
unobserved factors and estimates a lower value of an MBG (δ0 = 5.163).
Next, we conduct two formal endogeneity tests. The first test directly examines
the direction and significance of ρc1 . Recall our a priori expectation is that some
unobserved factors (e.g. content of reviews) influencing product valuation also affect
the sellers’ decision to offer the MBG, which gives rise to a positive ρ1 . Our estimate
of ρc1 = 0.375 (significant at 0.05 level) verifies this expectation. Our second test
is the well-known Hausman’s model specification test (Hausman, 1978). While the
null hypothesis is that both OLS (with controls) and FIML estimators are consistent
and hence OLS is more efficient14 , the alternative hypothesis is that only the FIML
estimator is consistent. Rejecting the null in our context would imply that the endogeneity of the MBG choice makes the OLS estimates systematically different from the
FIML estimates. We implement the Hausman test on the δ coefficients (χ2 (4) = 8.07,
p < 0.1) and find that the endogeneity problem has significantly influenced the OLS
estimation of our key parameters.
Having verified our choice of the estimation procedures, we now test the statistical significance of our hypotheses. The Wald tests in Table 4.5 show preliminary
supportive evidence for all three hypotheses. Specifically, the coefficients on shipping_charge i , slr_posi_log i , and slr_nega_log i are significant at 0.05 or lower levels.
We also conduct the more formal likelihood ratio test, which we illustrate here with
shipping_charge i . The log likelihood for the unconstrained model (i.e. FIML model
in Table 4.5) is −9602.31. Re-estimating the model with the δ coefficient on shipping_charge i constrained to zero reduces the log likelihood to −9609.75. Two times
14

The efficiency of OLS comes from estimating fewer parameters than FIML.
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the difference, 14.89, follows a Chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom, which
leads to a p-value smaller than 0.001. Therefore, the effect of shipping charge on the
value of an MBG policy is negative and significant, supporting Hypothesis 1. All
likelihood ratio test results are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Likelihood Ratio Tests

Effect size δ
Constrained LL
χ2 statistic
Test result
Conclusion

shipping_charge i
−0.124
−9609.75
14.89
p < 0.001
H1 supported

slr_posi_log i
1.313
−9628.55
52.47
p < 0.001
H2a supported

slr_nega_log i
−1.914
−9610.95
17.28
p < 0.001
H2b supported

In the following, we perform additional analysis to derive economic implications
of our hypothesized relationships. We also conduct a number of robustness checks of
our results. Lastly, we show how our estimation results may be used to calibrate a
shipping charge optimization model.

Shipping Charge
On one hand, our analysis confirms the previous literature that the shipping charge
alone does not affect the consumers’ product valuations (Leng and Becerril-Arreola,
2010; Lewis, 2006). That is, in the absence of returns, a lower shipping charge does
not alter the total amount of money a consumer is willing to pay for a product
(i.e. the α coefficient on shipping_charge i is insignificant). However, we extend the
literature on on-line retailing by showing that a forward shipping charge is considered
an implicit restocking fee by consumers and hence negatively affects the value of an
MBG policy.
There are several managerial implications related to this result. First, we empirically validate the intuitive notion that the value of an MBG policy is highest
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when forward shipping is free. We quantify this value for the consumer electronics
segment, finding that, for a seller with an average reputation (i.e. slr_posi_log i and
slr_nega_log i are at their respective means), the value of an MBG to consumers is
δb0 = 5.163%. In other words, if the seller switches from “returns not accepted” to
“money back guaranteed” given free forward shipping, she should expect a 5.163% lift
in consumers’ willingness to pay. Second, when both an MBG and forward shipping
charges exist, the latter erodes the value of the former considerably. The effect size
of shipping_charge i , −0.124, offers some insights into this point. As an example, if
the forward shipping charge increases from free to 10% of the total price, the value
of an MBG drops from 5.163% to 3.923%. Consider a $90 non-returnable digital
camera with $10 shipping charge, for a total price of $100. Our results suggest that
consumers are willing to pay $103.92 for the same camera with an MBG policy. However, if the non-refundable $10 was eliminated, the WTP increases $1.24 to $105.16.
To further explore the negative effect of shipping_charge i , we draw a confidence band
plot (Miller et al., 2013) in Figure 4.1, which depicts how the value of an MBG and
its 95% confidence interval (in shaded area) decrease as shipping_charge i increases
from 0 to 2015 . When shipping charge is close to 20% of total price, the value of an
MBG becomes statistically insignificant from zero.
Finally, we observe in the choice equation in Table 4.5 that the γ coefficient on
the shipping charge is negative and marginally significant, which means that a higher
shipping charge correlates with a lower probability to offer an MBG. This might be
indicative that the sellers on eBay are aware of the “incompatibility” between offering
an MBG and charging a high shipping fee.
15

We choose 20 as the maximum because the impact of shipping_charge i on N V is identified by
the transactions that offer MBG and charge a positive shipping fee. Among these transactions, the
90th percentile of shipping_charge i is approximately 20. Thus, for shipping_charge i > 20, the effect
of shipping_charge i is driven less by data but more by extrapolation.
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Figure 4.1 Effect of Shipping Charge on the Value of
MBG

Seller Reputation
The α coefficients on slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i are 0.83 and −3.338, respectively (Table 4.5). These results are in line with the two conclusions drawn by the
previous studies on e-reputation (e.g. Standifird, 2001): (1) positive and negative reputation have opposing effects on consumers’ product valuation, and (2) the negative
impact tends to be larger in size. We contribute to this literature by showing that a
seller’s e-reputation also affects the buyers’ valuation of an MBG policy. Specifically,
the δ coefficients on slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i show significant and opposite
effects. Furthermore, the negative impact has a larger effect size, |−1.914| > |1.313|.
But this difference is not statistically significant.
Reputation differs from shipping charge in that it is not generally considered to
be a seller’s decision (at least in the short term). Rather, it is a characteristic of the
seller. This fact leads us to use a different approach to derive managerial implications
from the reputation-related results. Specifically, we first cluster the sellers in our
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data according to slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i using the k-means algorithm16 . It
appears that three is the maximum number of clusters that would assure a reasonable
degree of heterogeneity across clusters (see Appendix H for details). Then, for each
cluster we derive the value of an MBG under two conditions; free shipping and a 20%
shipping cost. The results are presented in Table 4.7.
The average value of an MBG is smaller than 7% of product value across all six
scenarios. The main difference between clusters is the activeness of sellers. Interestingly, this does not a priori predict which seller cluster should enjoy the highest
value of an MBG, since more active sellers have a higher number of both positive and
negative reviews, which exert opposing effects. Our analysis indicates that while the
occasional sellers (least active) have the lowest value of MBGs, it is not the volume
sellers (most active) who enjoy the highest benefits of offering MBGs. Rather, it is
the moderately active sellers (Cluster 2) who receive the best payoff from offering an
MBG policy. The reason for this result is that as we move from Cluster 2 to Cluster 3, the increases in slr_nega_log i and slr_posi_log i are similar but slr_nega_log i
has a stronger impact. Furthermore, if an occasional seller charges a relatively high
shipping fee, her expected payoff from offering an MBG policy could be close to zero.
Table 4.7 The Value of MBGs by Seller Cluster
Cluster 1
Occasional Sellers
(2.10,0.10)1
shipping_charge i = 0
4.13
shipping_charge i = 20
1.64
1

Cluster 2
Moderate Sellers
(4.28,0.42)
6.38
3.89

Cluster 3
Volume Sellers
(6.92,2.45)
5.96
3.47

(x,y) are the means of slr_posi_logi and slr_nega_logi (no centering) for each cluster.

Finally, we turn to the choice regression. While the γ coefficient on slr_posi_log i
16

Alternatively, we could do a median-split for slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i to create four
seller profiles. However, this approach deviates from reality since sellers with few positive reviews
but a lot of negative reviews are extremely rare.

79

is insignificant, that on slr_nega_log i is positive and significant. This suggests that
sellers are acting in a way detrimental to themselves. That is, although sellers with
more negative reviews realize less value from an MBG, they are more likely to offer
MBGs. One explanation is that sellers struggling with negative feedback might be
using the MBG as a longer-term strategy to shift their reviews more positively. Such
strategic behavior is not captured by our analysis but is an interesting area for future
research.

Robustness Checks
We provide a number of robustness checks, which are summarized in Table 4.8. For
each robustness check model, we run our FIML estimator. To conserve space, we
present only the δ parameter estimates in Table 4.8, but the full set of results is
available from the authors upon request. First, we examine whether our results are
sensitive to the exclusion of some “extreme products” for which the MBG might
have a very high or very low importance to consumers. To this end, we rank the 86
products in our sample according to yi |I=1 − yi |I=0 , the normalized price differential
between MBG and no-MBG transactions. Model 1 contains the estimation results
from excluding the top 3 and bottom 3 products in this rank. Second, as discussed
in Section 4.3, a small fraction of our MBG transactions have a return window of 7
or 30 days, while the majority have a 14-day time window. We reran our analysis
in Model 2 by excluding this small fraction of transactions. Third, we have used the
number of reviews a seller received in the past twelve months to construct measures
for positive and negative reputation. In Model 3, we use the six-month statistics17
to create alternative measures for slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i . Fourth, we have
allowed both ρ0 and ρ1 to be freely estimated. While the rationale behind a positive
17

Although eBay also publishes three-month review statistics of each seller, we choose not to use
them because the majority (84.1%) of the sellers in our data received zero negative reviews in the
past three months.
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ρ1 is strong, our ex ante expectation for ρ0 is not very clear. Therefore, the correct
error structure might have ρ0 = 0. In Model 4, we explore whether our estimation
results are sensitive to this constraint. Lastly, while our empirical model is identified
with exactly the same set of variables in Xi and Zi , it is sometimes advised to include
additional variables in Zi to enhance identification (Heckman, 1997; Maddala, 1983;
Vella and Verbeek, 1999). To this end, we create MBG_popularity_log i to capture the
popularity of offering an MBG when transaction i was listed by its seller. Specifically,
MBG_popularity_log i is the logged number of with-MBG listings of the same product
at the time point when the seller posted i on eBay. This variable is expected to
affect a seller’s choice of offering an MBG, but not directly affect a buyer’s product
valuation since it is not visible when an auction completes. In Model 5, we insert
MBG_popularity_log i into Zi in addition to all the variables that appear in Xi .
As shown in Table 4.8, the results from our robustness checks are generally consistent with those in Table 4.5. One exception is Model 3, where weaker reputation
effects are observed. The exposition of seller profile web-pages might explain this observation. Specifically, the homepage of an eBay seller displays only the twelve-month
review statistics, whereas the six-month statistics are displayed on the feedback page
– one more click from the home page. Consequently, the twelve-month statistics are
more likely to draw attention from consumers and hence better capture the effects of
e-reputation.

Example Application: Managing the Forward Shipping Fee
Our results suggest that the forward shipping fee has implications for both the costs
and benefits of offering an MBG. Specifically, our analysis shows that the benefit of a
lower shipping charge relates to a higher value for an MBG. The costs, on the other
hand, include those associated with a higher probability of returns from consumers.
In the following, we use our estimated parameters as inputs to construct a simple
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Table 4.8 Robustness Checks

Variables
indicator for MBG Ii
shipping_charge i
slr_posi_log i
slr_nega_log i
N
+

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
δ coefficients (cluster robust
4.581** 4.906** 7.140***
(1.695)
(1.869)
(1.939)
-0.132** -0.125** -0.137***
(0.042)
(0.041)
(0.041)
1.283*** 1.314*** 0.978***
(0.219)
(0.218)
(0.243)
-1.939** -1.863*
-0.803
(0.664)
(0.757)
(0.628)
2894
2933
2946

Model 4 Model 5
standard errors)
6.058*
4.836**
(2.694)
(1.483)
-0.126** -0.124**
(0.042)
(0.041)
1.326*** 1.312***
(0.231)
(0.213)
+
-1.698
-1.975***
(0.925)
(0.562)
2946
2946

p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

model that incorporates the above trade-off. We consider the case where the retailer
chooses the forward shipping charge (κ) that will maximize its expected profit (π)
from each sale.
Let πkeep (πreturn ) denote the unit profit of a sold item that is kept (returned)
by a consumer. Unit expected profit can be expressed as π = [1 − Pr(return)] ×
πkeep + Pr(return) × πreturn , where πkeep is simply the difference between unit price
(p) and unit cost of producing and shipping the product (c), i.e. πkeep = p − c.
In order to focus on our variable of interest, the shipping fee, we assume that p,
the price without an MBG policy, is exogenous to the model. With an MBG in
place, the retailer adjust price upward according to the estimated value of an MBG
such that p = p(1 +

NV
).
100

Assuming the retailer has average reputation indices, we

have N V = δ0 + δκ 100κ
, where δκ and δ0 are the coefficients on shipping_charge i
p
and Ii , and

100κ
p

converts κ into the percentage measure of the shipping charge in

our empirical analysis. Thus, πkeep = p +

pδ0
100

+ κδκ − c. If a consumer decides to

return the purchased item, the retailer keeps the forward shipping charge, salvages
the returned item, and incurs the unit cost. That is, πreturn = κ + s − c, where s
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denotes the salvage value. Let λ denote the return probability under free shipping,
i.e. Pr(return|κ = 0) = λ. Since κ = p essentially means no return is allowed, we
have Pr(return|κ = p) = 0. For simplicity, we assume the return probability moves
linearly in κ such that Pr(return) = λ(1 − κp ) = λ −

λκ
pδ

p+ 1000 +κδκ

. Making the relevant

substitutions, we have the following retailer profit function:
λκ

max π = [1 − λ +

0≤κ≤0.2p

p+

pδ0
100

+ κδκ

](p +

pδ0
λκ
+ κδκ ) + [λ −
] × (κ + s) − c
pδ0
100
p + 100 + κδκ

We let the feasible range of shipping charge be between 0 and 0.2p because our
estimates of δ0 and δκ are most reliable within this range – the same reason that
Figure 4.1 has its x-axis between 0 and 20. The unit cost, c, can be normalized to
zero since it does not affect the choice of the forward shipping fee.
We use the Nikon Coolpix L810 digital camera (“camera” hereafter) to illustrate
the implementation of the above model. While δ0 and δκ are available from Table 4.5,
additional data from eBay is collected to calibrate p and s. Specifically, we collect the
fixed-price transactions of the camera in new, open-box, and used conditions. The
average price of the transactions in a new condition and without an MBG policy is
used as an approximation for p. The average prices of open-box and used transactions
are used as the upper (sH ) and lower (sL ) bounds of s, giving p = $190, sH = $180
and sL = $100 (rounded to tens). The last parameter to calibrate is λ. Douthit
et al. (2011) and Tuttle (2011) report that the return rate for consumer electronics is
between 10% to 20%. Similar to s, we use these two numbers as the upper (λH ) and
lower (λL ) bounds of λ. In Table 4.9, we show how the optimal forward shipping fee,
κ∗ , varies as a function of the salvage value and the return rate under free shipping.
Note that the feasible range for κ is between $0 and $38, which is given by 0 ≤ κ ≤
0.2p. If the optimized unit profit is smaller than the profit without an MBG ($190),
we replace the shipping fee with "No MBG" in the table.
Several observations can be made from Table 4.9. When the return rate is high, the
retailer should either consider charging a high shipping fee or not offering an MBG. In
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Table 4.9 Optimal Forward Shipping Fee
p = $190
Salvage value
sL
$100
$120
$140
$160
sH
$180
1

Return rate given free shipping
λL
10%
$35
$26
$17
$8
$0

12%
No MBG
$38
$35
$26
$17

14%
No MBG
$38
$38
$38
$29

16%
No MBG
$38
$38
$38
$38

λH
18%
20%
No MBG No MBG
No MBG No MBG
$38
$381
$38
$38
$38
$38

The upper bound of foreward shipping fee is $38.

this case, consumers’ increased WTP resulting from offering an MBG policy does not
cover the loss incurred from handling returns. When the return rate is relatively low,
how the retailer should set its forward shipping fee largely depends on the product’s
salvage value. Therefore, once a retailer commits to offering an MBG, the forward
shipping fee should, if possible, be treated as a strategic decision variable. Since the
optimal shipping fee is likely to vary across products, there is incentive for the retailer
to customize its shipping charges this way18 .

4.6

Conclusion

This study represents the first in-depth empirical examination of the value of an MBG
policy in online retailing, and we provide new insights into the influence of shipping
charges and seller reputation on this value. As revealed by the empirical analysis, the
value of an MBG for consumer electronics sold online is, on average, smaller than 7%
of the total product value (Table 4.7). This is substantially lower than the 20% to
30% for catalog apparel products estimated by Anderson et al. (2009). This difference
may be explained by the varied degree of word-of-mouth information available for the
18
As a cautionary note to the above discussion, we clarify that the extent to which a retailer
can adjust the partition between base product price and shipping charge may be constrained by the
OEM. It appears that some OEMs allow a minimal degree of freedom for their retailers to change
the product price. For example, most Apple products and Bose headphones are nearly identically
priced across major retailers. In these cases, the strategic optimization of the shipping fee discussed
in this section may not be a realistic option.
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two product categories. For consumer electronics, there is abundant product review
information on the web (each product included in our sample has its own review page
on eBay). Consumers could also augment this information by searching on other
websites such as Amazon and CNET. As a result, much of the uncertainty regarding
product fit may potentially be resolved before purchase, which limits the value of
an MBG policy. In comparison, word-of-mouth information for apparel products is
much less available, given their wide variety. Furthermore, it is likely to be more
difficult for consumers to use word-of-mouth information to determine the fit of an
apparel product.
Specific to on-line retailing, we find that consumers treat the forward shipping fee
as an implicit restocking fee. As a result, it erodes the value of an MBG, and the
magnitude of this negative effect is large. To illustrate, if 20% of a product’s total
price is attributed to shipping, the value of an MBG could be statistically indifferent
from zero for some sellers. Given that a non-refundable shipping fee also affects
the probability and the cost of returns, retailers may consider using it strategically
to optimize profit as demonstrated in Section 4.5. We also contribute to the ereputation literature by showing how consumers may infer the credibility of a seller’s
MBG promise from its reputation indices. This result leads to the finding that the
most active sellers, who accumulate more positive as well as negative reviews, are not
necessarily the ones who enjoy the highest payoff from offering an MBG.
Our work also helps illustrate the problem of using overly simplistic methods to
estimate the value of MBGs. Table 4.10 provides a by-category comparison of the
MBG values estimated through different methods. The naïve approach first takes a
simple mean difference of MBG and no-MBG transactions for each product and then
summarizes these mean differences by category (also shown in Table 4.2). Although it
is very straightforward to implement, this approach does not account for differences in
shipping fees nor the sellers’ endogenous choice to offer an MBG policy. Furthermore,
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there is no clear pattern that the naïve approach over or under estimates the value
of an MBG. It may have particularly poor performance when MGB and non-MBG
transactions exhibit considerable differences in other dimensions. For example, in the
scanner category, sellers with an MBG policy happen to be the ones who charge higher
forward shipping fees and have lower reputation. As a result, the naïve approach
significantly under-estimates the value of an MBG for the scanner category. As
compared with the naïve approach, the OLS approach takes the contingency of the
MBG value into account, but it generally over-estimates the value of an MBG policy.
The extent of exaggeration for the OLS approach can be quite large, which is evident
from comparing the OLS and FIML estimates. In summary, while return managers
could use simple methods (such as the naïve and OLS approaches) to produce a quick
preview on the value of an MBG, a more sophisticated analysis is required to model
confounding factors and account for endogeneity.
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Table 4.10 Estimates of MBG Value by Category
Naïve
Est. ($)
4.08
8.18
12.07
10.84
10.88
16.2
2.48
10.41
6.36
4.65
2.89
6.99
5.04
5.58
21.31
2.83

OLS (with controls)
FIML
1
2
Product ($) category
Est. ($) Pct. Diff.
Est. ($)1 Pct. Diff.2
Audio System
8.26
103%
5.67
39%
Calculator
6.56
-20%
4.72
-42%
Camcorder
23.97
99%
17.43
44%
Camera
18.38
70%
12.83
18%
Camera Lens
17.70
63%
12.06
11%
Vacuum Cleaner
20.95
29%
15.08
-7%
DVD Player
3.79
53%
2.72
10%
GPS
11.46
10%
8.15
-22%
Headphone
4.00
-37%
2.61
-59%
Keyboard
3.91
-16%
2.46
-47%
Modem
3.33
15%
2.12
-27%
MP3 Player
9.66
38%
6.21
-11%
Printer
3.73
-26%
2.25
-55%
Scanner
22.01
294%
14.95
168%
Tablet
15.38
-28%
10.50
-51%
Webcam
5.26
86%
3.68
30%
1
The OLS and FIML estimates are obtained by computing ηi for each observation, converting
it to the dollar measure, and summarizing the dollar measures by category.
2
The percentage differences compare OLS and FIML estimates with the naïve estimates.
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Chapter 5
Future Research
While our consumer opportunism model in Chapter 2 captures the essential elements
of the consumer returns context with opportunism, there are other aspects that could
be considered in future research. In an effort to discourage policy abusers, some
retailers limit the maximum dollar value returnable by a single consumer within a
period of time1 . Evaluating the effectiveness of this practice requires a multi-period
framework, which is an interesting area of future inquiry. In addition, a competitive
model might provide a nice complement to our insights, although to remain tractable
it would require a simplified analytical framework that would sacrifice some of the
richness of our single-retailer analysis.
Given the evidence in Chapter 3 that using transactions data significantly improves returns forecasting, an interesting extension to this stream of work is to empirically estimate the cost savings that an improved product return forecast provides.
Through exploring the drivers of return probability, we have provided guidance on
how to better target buyer assistance. Future studies using more complete data sets
can extend this analysis by incorporating a retailer’s current allocation of buyer assistance efforts as an endogenous decision by the retailer when estimating its impact
on product return rates.
Chapter 4 has shown how retailers could better management their returns with
a clearer picture of the trade-off involved with shipping charges. Similarly, a longer
1

For example, Best Buy explicitly states on their website that they reserve the right to refuse
further returns if the consumer’s return volume is considered too “excessive”.
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return time window also has both cost and benefit implications. Our eBay data has
limited variation in return time window, which restricts us from quantifying the value
of time for consumers to evaluate a product. Future research could experimentally
examine how consumers react to different lengths of return time windows. This
information could then facilitate analytical models of optimal time window policies.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2.1
We show in Equation (2.3) the retailer’s profit function given that both segments are
willing to buy (π1 and π2 in Table A). To ensure that serving both segments is indeed
the retailer’s optimal choice, we also need to calculate its profit when serving only one
segment and show that such profit is strictly dominated by serving both segments.
The scenario where the retailer sells only to ordinary consumers can be eliminated
as follows. Observe that Uop − Uor is equal to
for

p−f
1−β

β(p−f )2
2(1−β)

for

p−f
1−β

< 1 and to

β−(1+f −p)2
2

> 1. We can conclude Uop > Uor from both cases. Thus, if opportunistic

consumers are unwilling to buy (Uop < 0), ordinary consumers are also unwilling to
buy (Uor < Uop < 0). Therefore, if the retailer considers serving only one segment, it
must be the segment of opportunistic consumers (π3 and π4 in Table A)1 . Intuitively,
this might happen when there are many opportunistic consumers – γ is close to its
upper limit, 12 .
Table A.1 Retailer Profit Function (Main Model)

Uor ≥ 0, Uop ≥ 0
Uor < 0, Uop ≥ 0

p−f ≤1−β
π1 = (1 − γ)πor + γπop1
π3 = γπop1

1

p−f ≥1−β
π2 = (1 − γ)πor + γπop2
π4 = γπop2

If both Uop and Uor are negative, no consumer will buy and the retailer’s profit is zero. This case
is strictly dominated by serving both segments since the optimal profits in Table A.2 are positive.
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Table A.2 Optimal Return Policies (Main Model)
Case I

Case II

Case III

low β

high β, low γ

high β, high γ

p∗

1+β 2 (1−2γ)2 +s21 (1−β)2 (1−γ)2 +2s1 s2 (1−β)(1−γ)γ+s22 γ 2 −β(2−4γ)
2(1−β+2βγ)2

1+s21 −2(2+s1 +s21 )γ+(5+s1 (2+s1 ))γ 2
2(1−2γ)2

2(1−β)+β 2
2

f∗

(−1+β+s1 (1−β)(1−γ)+s1 γ−2βγ)2
2(1−β+2βγ)2

(1−s1 )2 (1−γ)2
2(1−2γ)2

β2
2

π∗

(1−2c+s21 )(1−β)2 +2(1−β)(s1 (s2 −s1 (1−β))+β−2cβ)γ+(s2 −s1 (1−β))2 γ 2
2(1−β)(1−β(1−2γ))

1+s21 −(21+s1 +s21 −s2 )γ+((1+s1 )2 −4s2 )γ 2 −c(2−4γ)
2−4γ

2(s1 +β)(1−β)(1−γ)+2s2 γ+β 2 −2c
2

1 −1)
1 −s2
Case I conditions: β ∈ [0, 1 − s1 ] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 21 ], or β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1 − s2 ] ∪ γ ∈ [γb , 21 ], or β ∈ [1 − s2 , 2−s
] ∪ γ ∈ [ (s(1−β)(β+s
, 1]
2−s1
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2 2
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β+s1 −1
]
Case II conditions: β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1 − s2 ] ∪ γ ∈ [0, γb ], or β ∈ [1 − s2 , 1] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 2β+s
1 −1
β+s1 −1
β+s1 −1 1
1 −s2
1 −s2
Case III conditions: β ∈ [1 − s2 , 2−s
] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
, (1−β)(β+s1 −1) ], or β ∈ [ 2−s
, 1] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
, ]
2−s1
2−s1
1 −1 (s1 +2β)(1−β)−s2
1 −1 2
√
s22 +4s21 (1−β)−2s1 (1+3s2 −3β)(1−β)−(−1+β)2 +4s2 (1−β)(1−2β)− (s2 +β−1)2 (s22 −6s2 (1−β)+(1−β)2 +4s1 (1−β)(1+s2 +β)+4s21 (1−β 2 ))
b
where γ =
4(s1 −s2 )2 +β+(2−s1 )(s1 −2s2 )β−(1+2s1 −4s2 )β 2

In the following, we use a two-step procedure to prove Lemma 2.1. First, we
assume the retailer serves both segments and derive p∗ , f ∗ , and π ∗ . Second, we show
that within the parameter space of interest, γ ∈ [0, 21 ] and β ∈ [0, 1], serving only the
opportunistic segment is strictly dominated given c < M in[

1−s1 +2s21 2s2 +s21 (−1+s2 (2+s2 ))
].
,
2
4s2
 2−2β+2βγ 2−2β+2βγ

−
1−β
1−β

Uor ≥ 0 and p − f ≤ 1 − β. The Hessian of π1 is given by

2−2β+2βγ
1−β

− 2−2β+2βγ
1−β

,

which is negative definite given γ ∈ [0, 12 ] and β ∈ [0, 1]; i.e. the profit function is
jointly strictly concave in p and f . Rewriting π1 into the Lagrangian format, we have
L1 = π1 + µ1 Uor + µ2 (1 − β − p + f ). It is straightforward to verify that π1∗ is obtained
either with only Uor = 0 or both constraints binding. p∗1 , f1∗ , and π1∗ in the former
scenario is given in Case I in Table A.2; the corresponding parameter conditions are
1 −1)
1 −s2
β ∈ [0, 1 − s1 ] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 21 ] or β ∈ [1 − s1 , 2−s
] ∪ γ ∈ [ (s(1−β)(β+s
, 1 ]. p∗1 , f1∗ ,
2−s1
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2 2

and π1∗ in the latter scenario is given in Case III in Table A.2; the corresponding
1 −s2
1 −s2
parameter conditions are β ∈ [ 2−s
, 1] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 12 ] or β ∈ [1 − s1 , 2−s
] ∪
2−s1
2−s1
1 −1)
]. Since f1∗ in both cases is strictly positive and p∗1 > f1∗ must be
γ ∈ [0, (s(1−β)(β+s
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2

true given the second constraint, we also have p∗1 > f1∗ > 0.
Uor ≥ 0 and p − f ≥ 1 − β. The Hessian of π2 is given by



−2(1−γ) 2(1−γ)
2(1−γ) −2(1−γ)



, which

is negative definite given γ ∈ [0, 12 ]; i.e. the profit function is jointly strictly concave
in p and f . Similarly, π2∗ is also obtained either with with only Uor = 0 or both
constraints binding. p∗2 , f2∗ , and π2∗ in the former scenario is given in Case II in Table
β+s1 −1
A.2; the corresponding parameter conditions are β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 2β+s
]. p∗2 ,
1 −1

f2∗ , and π2∗ in the latter scenario is given in Case III in Table A.2; the corresponding
β+s1 −1 1
parameter conditions are β ∈ [1−s1 , 1] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
, ] or β ∈ [0, 1−s1 ] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 12 ].
1 −1 2

Again, p∗1 > f1∗ > 0 is verified.
Compare π1∗ with π2∗ . Observe that π1∗ = π2∗ when p − f = 1 − β. Therefore, if π1∗
is obtained with p − f = 1 − β, it must be true that π1∗ ≤ π2∗ , vice versa. As a result,
we can immediately show that (1) π1∗ > π2∗ and Case I is optimal when β ∈ [0, 1 − s1 ]
β+s1 −1 1
1 −s2
, ] or β ∈ [1 − s2 , 2−s
] ∪
∪ γ ∈ [0, 21 ] or β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1 − s2 ] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
2−s1
1 −1 2
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1 −1)
γ ∈ [ (s(1−β)(β+s
, 1 ], (2) π1∗ < π2∗ and Case II is optimal when β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1 − s2 ]
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2 2

β+s1 −1
1 −1)
] or β ∈ [1 − s2 , 1] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 2β+s
], and (3) π1∗ = π2∗
∪ γ ∈ [0, (s(1−β)(β+s
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2
1 −1
β+s1 −1
1 −s2
and Case III is optimal when β ∈ [1 − s2 , 2−s
] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
, (1−β)(β+s1 −1) ] or
2−s1
1 −1 (s1 +2β)(1−β)−s2
β+s1 −1 1
1 −s2
, 1] ∪ γ ∈ [ 2β+s
β ∈ [ 2−s
, ]. The only parameter space left is β ∈ [1−s1 , 1−s2 ] ∪
2−s1
1 −1 2
1 −1)
, β+s1 −1 ], where both π1∗ and π2∗ are obtained without p−f ≥ 1−β
γ ∈ [ (s(1−β)(β+s
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2 2β+s1 −1

binding. By explicitly examining the sign of π1∗ − π2∗ , we can show that it is positive
when γb < γ and negative otherwise. The above gives us all the β and γ conditions
in Table A.2.
Compare M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] with M ax[π3∗ , π4∗ ]. Next, we rule out the possibility that
the retailer wants to serve only the opportunistic segment; i.e.

M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] <

M ax[π3∗ , π4∗ ]. The respective optimization problems for π3 and π4 are rather straightforward. Specifically, π3∗ =

(1+s22 −2c(1−β)−β)γ
2(1−β)

when β ∈ [1, 1 − s2 ] and π3∗ =

(β+2s2 −2c)γ
2

when β ∈ [1, 1 − s2 ], while π4∗ is always obtained with p − f ≥ 1 − β binding.
Since π3∗ = π4∗ given p − f = 1 − β, we conclude that π3∗ dominates π4∗ . Now,
we need to verify that M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] > π3∗ . We separate this comparison into the
sub-scenarios where β < 1 − s1 , 1 − s1 < β < 1 − s2 and β > 1 − s2 . When
∗
(the optimal profit in Case I). It is easy
β < 1 − s1 , M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] ≥ π1∗ ≥ πCaseI
∗
− π3∗ is inverted U-shaped in s2 , which implies that the minto verify that πCaseI
∗
− π3∗ is either at s2 = 0 or s2 = s1 . Given c <
imum of πcase1

1−s1 +2s12
,
2

both

∗
∗
∗
− π3∗ |s2 →0 > 0 and πCaseI
− π3∗ |s2 →s1 > 0, which ensures πCaseI
> π3∗ . Similarly,
πCaseI
∗
∗
when 1 − s1 < β < 1 − s2 , M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] ≥ π1∗ ≥ πCaseI
and πCaseI
− π3∗ is inverted

U-shaped in s2 . Given c <

2s2 +s21 (−1+s2 (2+s2 ))
,
4s2

∗
again both πCaseI
− π3∗ |s2 →0 > 0 and

∗
∗
πCaseI
− π3∗ |s2 →s1 > 0. When β > 1 − s2 , M ax[π1∗ , π2∗ ] ≥ π1∗ ≥ πCaseIII
(the optimal
∗
profit in Case 3). πCaseIII
is strictly larger than π3∗ given the range of β. To sum2

marize, as long as c < M in[ 1−s1 2+2s1 ,

2s2 +s21 (−1+s2 (2+s2 ))
],
4s2

retailer is strictly better off

with serving both segments and the specific optimal strategies are listed in Table A.2.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2.1
In Case I,

∂p∗
∂γ

+s1 β)(s1 (1−β)(1−γ)+s2 γ)
= − (1−β)(s1 −s2(1+β(−1+2γ))
< 0,
3

s1 (1−β)(1−γ)
1+β(−1+2γ))3

> 0, and

In Case II,

∂p∗
∂γ

∂p∗
∂γ

−

∂f ∗
∂γ

∂f ∗
∂γ

=

(1−β)(s1 −s2 +s1 β)(1−β−s2 γ+2βγ)
−
(1+β(−1+2γ))3

1 (1−β)(1−γ)+2s2 γ−2βγ)
= − (1−β)(s1 −s2 +s1 β)(1−β−2s
< 0.
(1+β(−1+2γ))3

)(s1 (1−γ)−γ)
= − (1−s1(1−2γ)
< 0,
3

∂f ∗
∂γ

=

(1−s1 )2 (1−γ)
(1−2γ)3

> 0, and

∂p∗
∂γ

−

1 (−1+γ))
− (1−s1 )(1+2s
< 0. In Case III, γ has no impact on p∗ and f ∗ . Thus,
(1−2γ)3

∂f ∗
∂γ

≥ 0, and

∂p∗
∂γ

≤

∂f ∗
∂γ

.
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∂f ∗
∂γ

∂p∗
∂γ

=

≤ 0,

Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.1
In Case I,

∂π ∗
∂γ

=

s1 (s1 −s2 )(1−β)2 −(s2 −s1 (1−β))2 ((1−β)γ+βγ 2 )
.
(−1+β)(−1+β−2βγ)2

b
negative. For β > β,

In Case II,
√
1−s1 +

∂π ∗
∂γ

(1+s1 )2 −4s2
2

= −

∂π ∗
∂γ

< 0 when γ <

(1+2s1 +s21 −4s2 )(1−2γ)2 +(1−s1 )2
,
4(1−2γ)2

and γ >

1−s1 −

√

√

2

which is positive when β >

(1+s1 )2 −4s2

(1+s1

∂π ∗
∂γ

U-shaped in γ with

∂π ∗
s
|
∂γ γ→ s2 −s12(1−β)

U-shaped in γ with

∂π ∗
∂γ

|
γ→

)2 −4s

√

1−s1 +

b
shown that (1) when β < β,

−

2

1
β

and

∂π ∗
∂γ

∂π ∗
∂γ

is strictly

> 0 otherwise.

which is positive only when β >

. In Case III,

∂π ∗
∂γ

= s2 − (s1 + β)(1 − β),

(1+s1 )2 −4s2
.
2

Taking the above together, we have
√
1−s1 + (1+s1 )2 −4s2
b
< 0, (2) when β < β <
, π ∗ is
√2
1−s1 + (1+s1 )2 −4s2
, π ∗ is
− 1 = 0, and (3) when β >
2
β

√
= 0. In addition, it is easy to verify that
2
√ (1+s1 ) −4s2

1−s1 −
2

∂ 2 π∗
∂2γ

s2
s2 −s1 (1−β)

b
Given β < β,

(1+s1 )2 −4s2

> 0 holds globally.
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Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 2.3
In Case I,

∂π ∗
∂β

2 γ)(s1 (1−β)(1−γ)−s2 (1−β−γ+2βγ))
= − γ(s1 (1−β)(1−γ)+s(1−β)
, which is positive for
2 (1−β+2βγ)2

2 )(−1+β)
1 −s2
2
, 1 ] or β ∈ [1 − s2 , 2−s
, 1 − s2 ] ∪ γ ∈ [ s2(s−s1 −s
]∪γ ∈
either β ∈ [ s1s−s
2−s1
1
1 (1−β)−2s2 β 2
1 −1)
[ (s(1−β)(β+s
, 1 ] and negative otherwise. In Case II,
1 +2β)(1−β)−s2 2

∂π ∗
∂β

= 0. In Case III,

∂π ∗
∂β

= (1−

γ)(1 − s1 − β) + βγ, which is strictly positive given the boundary conditions of Case 3.
In summary, we have
∂π ∗
∂β

∂π ∗
∂β

2 )(−1+β)
2
> 0 for β ∈ [ s1s−s
, 1] and γ ∈ [M ax[ s2(s−s1 −s
, β+s1 −1 ], 21 ],
1
1 (1−β)−2s2 β 2β+s1 −1

β+s1 −1
= 0 for β ∈ [1 − s1 , 1] and γ ∈ [0, M in[γb , 2β+s
]], and
1 −1
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∂π ∗
∂β

< 0 otherwise.

Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Solving the retailer’s optimization problem in the extended model yields the following
lemma:
Lemma E.1. The retailer’s optimal price (p∗ ) and restocking fee (f ∗ ) depend on the
extent (γ) and the benefit (β) of opportunism, which together define three regions of
the solution space. Table E summarizes p∗ , f ∗ , and optimal profit (π ∗ ), as well as
the boundary conditions for each region.
Analysis for Lemma E.1 follows exactly the same steps as for Lemma 2.1. Again,
a mild condition on the unit production cost, c <

1−s+s2
,
2

ensures that it is optimal

for the retailer to serve both segments.
In Case I,

∂π ∗
∂β

=

γ(s(1+β(−1+γ))−βγδ)(sβγ+(−1+β−βγ)δ)
,
(1−β)2 (1−β+2βγ)2

2δ
which is positive for β ∈ [ s+δ
, 1]

, 1 ] and negative otherwise. In Case II,
and γ ∈ [ δ(1−β)
β(s−δ) 2

∂π ∗
∂β

= −γδ. In Case III,

∂π ∗
∂β

=

1 − s(1 − γ) − β(1 − 2γ) − γ(1 + δ), which is positive for either β ∈ [1 − s + δ, 2(1−s)
] and
2−s−δ
γ ∈ [ δ(1−β)
, (1−β)(s+β−1) ] or β ∈ [ 2(1−s)
, 1] and γ ∈ [ δ(1−β)
, 1 ], and negative otherwise.
β(s−δ) β(2−s−2β+δ)
2−s−δ
β(s−δ) 2
To summarize, we have

∂π ∗
∂β

2δ
> 0 for β ∈ [ s+δ
, 1] and γ ∈ [ δ(1−β)
, 1 ] and
β(s−δ) 2

otherwise.
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∂π ∗
∂β

< 0

Table E.1 Optimal Return Policies When Salvage Value Linked to Benefit of Opportunism
Case I

Case II

Case III

low β

high β, low γ

high β, high γ

p∗

s2 (1−β(1−γ))2 +(1−β(1−2γ))2 −2sβγ(1−β+βγ)δ+β 2 γ 2 δ 2
2(1−β+2βγ)2

1+s2 −2(2+s+s2 )γ+(5+s(2+s))γ 2
2(1−2γ)2

2(1−β)+β 2
2

f∗

(−1+β+s(1+β(−1+γ))−βγ(2+δ))2
2(1−β+2βγ)2

(1−s)2 (1−γ)2
2(1−2γ)2

β2
2

(1−γ)2 +s2 (1−γ)2 −2sγ 2 +2βγ(1−2γ)δ−c(2−4γ)
2−4γ

2(s+β)(1−β)(1−γ)+2(s−βδ)γ+β 2 −2c
2

π∗

1+s2 (1+β(−1+γ))2 +2sβγ(−1+β−βγ)δ−β(2−β−2γ+2βγ−βγ 2 δ 2 )
2(1−β)(1−β(1−2γ))

−c

1−s
1−s 2(1−s)
Case 1 conditions: β ∈ [0, 1 − s] ∪ γ ∈ [0, 21 ], or β ∈ [1 − s, 1−δ
] ∪ γ ∈ [γbb , 12 ], or β ∈ [ 1−δ
, 2−s−δ ] ∪ γ ∈ [ (1−β)(s+β−1)
, 1]
β(2−s−2β+δ) 2
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s+β−1
1−s
1−s
] ∪ γ ∈ [0, γbb ], or β ∈ [ 1−δ
, 1] ∪ γ ∈ [0, s+2β−1
]
Case 2 conditions: β ∈ [1 − s, 1−δ
1−s−β (1−β)(s+β−1)
s+β−1 1
1−s 2(1−s)
Case 3 conditions: β ∈ [ 1−δ
, 2−s−δ ] ∪ γ ∈ [ 1−s−2β
, β(2−s−2β+δ) ], or β ∈ [ 2(1−s)
, 1] ∪ γ ∈ [ s+2β−1
, 2]
2−s−δ
√
(2β−1)(−1+β−s(−2+s+2β)+2β(−2+s+2β)δ−βδ 2 )+β(−1+β)(1+δ)(−1+2s+δ)− (−1+s+β−βδ)2 ((1−β+s(−1+2β))2 +2β(3−3β+s(−3+2β))δ+β 2 δ 2 )
where γbb =
4(−1+β−s(−2+s+2β)+2β(−2+s+2β)δ−βδ 2 )β

Appendix F
More on Forecasting Model Specification
c in the two-week and one-month scenarios are presented in Table
Specifications of R
t

F.1. When length per period is one month, we incorporate seasonality in the benchmark forecasts of Rt and Rc,t . Further, when including the full set of covariates,
the maximum likelihood estimation of our econometric model sometimes does not
converge. We constrain the correlation parameter, θ, to zero to ensure convergence
in these cases.
Table F.1 Model Specification for Two-week and One-month Cases
Two Weeks Per Period
Baseline
R\
t

One Month Per Period
[ int(1 t )

same as Equation(3.8)

12

t
Pint( 12
) Rt−12j

j=1

Qt−12j

] × Qt

int( 12t ) is the integer part of
\
RtSmoothing
ARIM A
R\
t

LagSales
R\
t

\AX
RtARIM

d
R
p,t

same as Equation(3.9)

same as Equation(3.9)

a0 + α1 Rt−1 + α2 et−1 + et

α0 + α1 Rt−1 + α2 et−12 + et

α0 +
α0 +

9
P

αj Qt−j + et

α0 +

j=1
9
P

αj Qt−j + κt

α0 +

j=1

4
P

t
12

αj Qt−j + holidayt + et

j=1
4
P

αj Qt−j + holidayt + κt

j=1

κt = α10 κt−1 + α11 et−1 + et

κt = α10 κt−1 + et

same as Equation(3.13)

same as Equation(3.13)

1

ARIMA model in the one month case is essentially a SARIMA(1,0,0)×(0,0,1)12 model.

2

Triple exponential smoothing cannot converge in the one month case because there are only four

cycles to start with. Therefore, we continued the use of a simple exponential smoothing model.
3

Using a full set of month dummies in the lagged sales and ARIMAX models overfits data and

produces poor forecast. A holiday dummy differentiates November and December.
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Appendix G
Finite Sample Performance of the Estimators
We conduct a simulation study to evaluate the finite sample properties of the OLS,
2SLS, and FIML estimators, when the underlying econometric model is specified
by the three-equation system as in (4.1a), (4.1b), and (4.4). The following Data
Generating Process (DGP) is used:
Ii = 1(−0.6 + w1i + w2i + w3i + ui > 0)

(G.1)

∗
y0i
= 1 + w1i + w2i + e0i

(G.2)

∗
y1i
= 2 + 2w1i + w2i + e1i

(G.3)

where σo = σ1 = 1, ρ0 = 0.2 or 0.5, and ρ1 = 0.5. The two versions of ρ0 creates one
case where ρ0 6= ρ1 and the other case where ρ0 = ρ1 . This would help us illustrate
the point that 2SLS is appropriate only when ρ0 = ρ1 . yi is created by the rule that
∗
∗
yi = y0i
if Ii = 0 and yi = y1i
if Ii = 1. Given the DGP, we know the true parameter

values are α0 = 1, α0 = (1, 1), δ0 = 1, and δ 0 = (1, 1)1 .
We generate 500 simulated samples for each of the ρ0 = ρ1 and ρ0 6= ρ1 cases.
Each sample has 10000 observations. Next, we use the three estimators to recover
the α and δ parameters. w3i is used as an instrument for Ii when implementing the
2SLS estimator. It is, by the construction of DGP, a solid instrument – correlated
with Ii but not yi . Therefore, bias in the 2SLS estimator could only be attributed
to the problem of the estimator itself but not to the validity of the instrument. OLS
and 2SLS estimators are implemented with Stata’s “reg” and “ivreg” commands.
1

Recall that the δ parameters are the difference between the α and β parameters.
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The FIML estimator is programed with Stata’s general purpose maximum likelihood
estimation language “ml” as follows.
program define split\_heck
args lnf xb0 xb1 xb zg lnsig0 lnsig1 athrho0 athrho1
tempvar sigma0 sigma1 rho0 rho1 u0 u1
qui gen double ‘sigma0’=exp(‘lnsig0’)
qui gen double ‘sigma1’=exp(‘lnsig1’)
qui gen double ‘rho0’=tanh(‘athrho0’)
qui gen double ‘rho1’=tanh(‘athrho1’)
qui gen double ‘u0’=\$ML\_y1-‘xb0’-‘xb’
qui gen double ‘u1’=\$ML\_y1-‘xb1’-‘xb’
qui replace ‘lnf’=ln(normalden(‘u0’,0,‘sigma0’)*normal((-‘zg’-(‘rho0’/
‘sigma0’)*(‘u0’))/sqrt(1-(‘rho0’)^2))) if $ML_y2==0
qui replace ‘lnf’=ln(normalden(‘u1’,0,‘sigma1’)*normal((‘zg’+(‘rho1’/
‘sigma1’)*(‘u1’))/sqrt(1-(‘rho1’)^2))) if $ML_y2==1
end
ml model lf split\_heck (xb0: y I = w1) (xb1: w1) (xb: w2, nocons)
(zg: w1 w2 w3) (lnsig0: ) (lnsig1: ) (athrho0: ) (athrho1: )
ml max, diff
Results are summarized in Table G.1. We can make three observations from this
simulation study. First, OLS is always biased. Second, when ρ0 = ρ1 , both 2SLS and
FIML are unbiased. However, FIML is more efficient, which is evident in the smaller
standard errors. Third, when ρ0 6= ρ1 , only FIML is unbiased.
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Table G.1 Finite Sample Performance of OLS, 2SLS, and FIML Estimators

Mean

OLS
Bias2

S.E.

b0
α
b1
α
b2
α
δb0
δb1

0.7801
0.8985
0.8885
1.5889
0.9729

0.2199
0.1015
0.1115
0.5889
0.0271

0.0130
0.0133
0.0110
0.0248
0.0207

1.0004
1.0008
1.0002
0.9999
0.9979

b0
α
b1
α
b2
α
δb0
δb1

0.9014
0.9543
0.9261
1.4449
0.9251

0.0986
0.0457
0.0739
0.4449
0.0749

0.0133
0.0134
0.0116
0.0251
0.0207

1.0543
1.0396
1.0007
1.0588
0.8970

1

3

Mean

2SLS
Bias
ρ0 = ρ1
0.0004
0.0008
0.0002
0.0001
0.0021
ρ0 6= ρ1
0.0543
0.0396
0.0007
0.0588
0.1030

1

S.E.

Mean

FIML
Bias

0.0239
0.0294
0.0149
0.0574
0.0683

0.9999
0.9995
1.0003
0.9989
1.0013

0.0001
0.0005
0.0003
0.0011
0.0013

0.0193
0.0154
0.0132
0.0414
0.0221

0.0240
0.0303
0.0151
0.0569
0.0701

1.0000
0.9997
1.0005
0.9986
1.0012

0.0000
0.0003
0.0005
0.0014
0.0012

0.0215
0.0160
0.0137
0.0426
0.0227

S.E.

Mean is the average across 500 samples.
Bias is the difference between the true parameter value and the mean of the estimated values.
3
S.E. is the standard error of the estimated values across 500 samples.
2
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Appendix H
Clustering the Reputation Indices
We apply the k-means algorithm to slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i with k (number
of clusters) equal to 2, 3, and 4. Table H.1 summarizes the results. µp and µn are used
to denote the means of slr_posi_log i and slr_nega_log i within each cluster. As we
move from two clusters to three clusters, the additional cluster seems to add enough
heterogeneity. This is evident from the difference of µp across the three clusters. The
between-cluster difference of µn shows similar evidence. However, as we move into the
four-cluster scenario, Clusters 1-3 are quite homogeneous in their µn . This pattern
persists if more clusters are introduced. Therefore, we proceed with the three-cluster
result. The pattern of µp and µn informs us that the difference of sellers across clusters
is mainly their level of activeness on eBay. That is, the more active sellers receive
more positive as well as negative reviews. In fact, this observation strengthens the
validity of using cluster analysis to profile sellers instead of a high-low split, since the
chance of having a seller with limited positive reviews but many negative reviews is
very rare.
Table H.1 Cluster Analysis of Seller Reputation
Two Clusters
µp
µn
N
2.81 0.15 2003
5.82 1.45 943

Three Clusters
Four Clusters
µp
µn
N
µp
µn
N
2.10 0.10 1172 1.67 0.08 765
4.28 0.42 1369 3.49 0.20 1191
6.92 2.45 405 5.10 0.82 704
7.38 2.81 286

Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
µp and µn are the means of slr_posi_logi and slr_nega_logi (no centering)
for each cluster. N is the number of observations in each cluster.
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